Source:
Memoirs of Christina, Queen of Sweden, volume 1, pages 58 to 82, by Henry Woodhead, 1863; original at the University of Michigan
The account:
This [separating Christina from her mother] was not the only difficulty the Regents had to encounter. The Diet, of which they were the movers, was called on to provide supplies for the continuance of the war. Everyone who paid taxes was unwilling to have them increased.
The Scandinavian kingdoms had hardly reached that state in which war is understood to be a burthen and expense. They rather expected to be enriched by the plunder of other nations. A continual demand, not only for men but also for money, was severely felt by the classes that furnished both.
The conscription was so oppressive that, in Finland, the peasants went over in large bodies to Russia, for the purpose of escaping its operation; in other places they burned their houses and escaped to the woods.
Extraordinary taxes, according to the Constitution, could only be voted by the Diet. The Burghers remonstrated at the increasing expenses, and represented the exhaustion of the kingdom. They were, however, accustomed to pay, and were persuaded to do so again. They tried to introduce a little religious business, and proposed that all the Calvinists in Sweden should be forced to adopt the Lutheran faith. The sincerity of their theological zeal has been doubted, and it is said that this stipulation was inspired by jealousy of the great Dutch merchants De Geer.
The nobles, to their credit, successfully resisted this piece of intolerance; but the next question raised was of their contributing themselves to the necessities of the state. The aristocracy had hitherto been exempt from taxation.
A privilege so gratifying to their avarice, as well as to their pride, was not likely to be abandoned without a struggle. Oxenstiern acted as mediator between the nobles and the other States, and persuaded the former that it was only just they should now pay some taxes in return for past favours. If they had not done so the country would have sunk under the emergency, for the greater part of its wealth was in the hands of those who did not contribute to the taxes. They claimed great credit for their patriotism; but it was rather an enlightened self-interest which led the nobles to save from destruction a state in which they had so large a stake.
It was hoped that when the nobles consented to pay taxes, the clergy might be induced to follow their example; but this was far from being the case. The clergy deemed it a sacred duty to acquire what temporal benefits they could, but to impart only spiritual good. They voted as a separate State, and objected most strenuously to pay anything at all. The discussion lasted several days, and the amount of reason on their side was soon expended.
They then began to wax warm, and threatened Sweden with God's wrath and vengeance if they were not relieved from all taxes. The pertinacious Jacob de la Gardie urged, very logically, that if taxing the clergy did indeed call down God's wrath they were themselves already obnoxious to it, because, on former occasions, they had consented to pay taxes. The clergy answered that they would now consent to nothing of the sort.
The Council did not venture to provoke them[,] and the States separated in March, 1633. They met again at midsummer in the next year, and so much discontent was then manifested, that it was feared serious disturbances would arise. The peasants sent a list of their grievances to the Council, and threatened to leave the Diet if they were not redressed; so violent was their feeling that a Finnish peasant deputy was beaten in the assembly for being too favourable to the nobles. The chief discontent was about the expenses of the State, which it is important to notice, because Christina has been generally accused of causing the financial difficulties under which Sweden laboured at the time of her abdication, although these difficulties were really of much longer standing. Her profuseness added to the distress, but the real causes were the privileges of the nobles, and their ambition in continuing to carry on a war too great for the resources of the country.
But if Sweden had to encounter danger and difficulty at home, her power abroad was threatened with no less than total destruction. The Imperialists took fresh courage at the death of Gustavus. They considered that Sweden had undertaken a task beyond her strength, and that her success had been owing to the great military talent of the King, and to some fortunate accidents. They also believed that the Protestant coalition, deprived of its head, would soon dissolve, and leave Sweden to contend alone against Austria.
It would have been difficult for Sweden to have made an honourable peace at this moment, even if she had desired it.
Oxenstiern wrote to the Council, that the only chance was to put on a good countenance; "for", he quaintly added, "a dog who growls and shows his teeth, can make better terms than one who puts his tail between his legs and runs away."
His enemies were well aware of his abilities, and did not consider the Swedish cause quite ruined, so long as he was at the head of affairs. Immense offers were made him by Austria, to entice him into the Emperor's service, which it is needless to say Oxenstiern did not entertain for an instant.
France, though for some time she had subsidised Sweden, and was soon to become her ally, had yet some distinct interests of her own, among which was the desire to gain possession of Alsace, then held by the Swedish troops. Louis XIII. wrote flattering letters to Oxenstiern, in which he styled him "my cousin." He offered him the Electorate of Mayence for himself, and hinted that if he chose to demand the hand of Christina for one of his sons, France would support him, if necessary, even by arms. Oxenstiern knew it was the interest of his country he should be on good terms with France; he did not, therefore, affect any indignation at these proposals, but replied, calmly and simply, that they were too high for him.
Oxenstiern's first important act after the King's death, was to convoke an assembly of the Protestant States at Heilbronn. The most powerful, at the same time the most uncertain of the confederates, was the Elector of Saxony. Oxenstiern went to Dresden, before the meeting, to consult the Elector, but soon found there was little dependence to be placed in him; and even at this time some of the Saxon ministers were in favour of the Emperor. From Dresden, Oxenstiern proceeded to Berlin, to consult the Elector of Brandenburg. This prince was better disposed towards the Swedish alliance, and Oxenstiern judiciously held out to him the prospect of Christina's marriage with his son Frederick William, afterwards called the Great Elector. This alliance, which Gustavus Adolphus himself had projected, would have been a most suitable one, and it would be curious to speculate how different might have been the career of Christina, if this marriage had taken place, and the effect it might have had on Prussia and Sweden. Instead of remaining rivals, the two great Protestant countries of the north would have been united, and Frederick William might have raised Prussia to the dignity it attained one hundred years later, under his descendant, Frederick the Great.
Christina's genius, tempered and directed, would have conferred substantial benefits on mankind, instead of merely dazzling and surprising them.
Notwithstanding the opposition of the Elector of Saxony, deputies from the Protestant circles met at Heilbronn, the 8th of March, 1633.
Oxenstiern received them at his house, and got over, or rather evaded, the first difficulty, about precedence, by receiving them standing, in a room without any chairs. The Protestant princes were very jealous of Oxenstiern. They had submitted with reluctance to the ascendancy of Gustavus himself, but that a Swedish nobleman should have the direction of independent princes, was hardly to be borne. It was probably only their jealousy of one another, which caused the management of the "Evangelical Alliance" to be intrusted to Sweden and to Oxenstiern.
He was assisted by a council, consisting of a deputy from each state, and the confederates agreed to keep up an army of 60,000 men, and to make no separate peace. It was indeed an Herculean task to make these discordant elements unite, and Oxenstiern often despaired of doing anything with them. He wrote to the Swedish council, "It is difficult sometimes to manage those over whom one has lawful authority, much more, powerful princes, with their heads full of ancestors, and fancies many hundreds years old."
He concluded with the noble expression, "But when I consider the welfare of our Fatherland and our young Queen, and the honour of our people, it appears to me best to do what I can, sometimes with, sometimes without hope, but always my duty."
Oxenstiern took up his residence at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, as the most convenient place for communicating with the Confederates.
In addition to the enemies or doubtful friends by whom the Swedish army was surrounded, it was also threatened in the rear by Denmark. The only consideration which restrained the king of Denmark at this time, was the fact that he intended his son to be a suitor for Christina's hand, and although it was improbable that the Swedes would consent to an alliance with the family of Christian the Tyrant, still the king would not, by declaring war, renounce all chance of succeeding in the long cherished project of uniting the two crowns. Although his anxiety to prevent Sweden from occupying the shores of the Baltic was well known, he artfully offered himself as a mediator between Sweden and the Empire.
It was difficult for Oxenstiern to refuse his mediation, and it would have been dangerous to accept it; but the prudent statesman got out of the dilemma by proposing the joint mediation of Denmark, France, and Holland.
The Swedish army was commanded by Bernhard, Duke of Weimar, who had served under Gustavus Adolphus, and had brought the battle of Lutzen to a successful issue, after the king's death. He had considerable military abilities, and possessed a qualification which had become all important, popularity with the soldiers. The troops were no longer composed chiefly of Swedes, inspired by loyalty and devotion to their country. Their piety, which, if not quite so vehement, was as sincere as that of the English Puritans, had now ceased to exist. A reckless disregard of all principle had become prevalent on both sides.
After a decisive battle crowds of the defeated soldiers did not scruple to join the army of the victors, and even officers of high rank were not ashamed to change sides in this way. The Swedes, being generally successful, had plenty of such recruits, but two things were necessary to keep them to their standards, success and plunder.
Their General must possess the skill to lead them to victory; he must keep up some kind of subordination, without which no army could exist; but he must abandon the stern discipline of Gustavus Adolphus, which had rendered his troops terrible only to his enemies.
Bernhard of Weimar was well suited to such a post. He could sympathize with motives similar to those which governed his own conduct, as Bernhard himself fought for plunder, although he aimed at a higher prize than the mercenary trooper did, who loaded his horse indifferently with the spoils of friend or foe. Bernhard, like Wallenstein, sought to establish himself in Germany as an independent sovereign. Neither of them perceived that the days of Condottieri Princes were past, that the interests involved, and the powers engaged, in the present strife, were too great to allow adventurers to establish themselves as they had done in the middle ages.
A keen eye also was watching Bernhard; Oxenstiern, superior to temptation himself, steadily opposed the personal ambition of the Duke.
A mutiny broke out in the Swedish army, which was suspected to be secretly instigated by Bernhard. The troops demanded money, and their leader claimed the investiture of some fiefs in Franconia, and the title of Generalissimo of the Swedish armies. Oxenstiern preserved his usual calmness and presence of mind. He was so far from being intimidated by these demands, that he threatened to remove the Duke from his command altogether.
Bernhard was awed by his firmness, and gladly accepted the investiture of the fiefs as the subject of Sweden, instead of as an independent ruler.
The officers and troops soon returned to their duty; the Scotch Brigade, as before mentioned, took no part in the mutiny; overtures were made to their leader Ruthven, which he rejected with disdain.
Bernhard of Weimar was the only chief of the Swedish army who was not a Swede, and although his ability was perhaps not inferior to that of his successors, he was wanting in the singleness of purpose so conspicuous in the native commanders, which led them successfully through so many difficulties. During his time the fortune of the war fluctuated as it never did before or afterwards, and there was even a hesitation on the Swedish side about undertaking important operations, which was caused by the fear of treachery. The Duke had the unfortunate distinction of commanding in the only battle during the Thirty Years' War, in which the Swedes suffered a total defeat.
The battle of Nördlingen was fought in August, 1634. The Swedish Field-Marshal Horn, who was second in command, wished to wait for some reinforcements which were on their way; Bernhard not only refused to do this, but taxed Horn with cowardice. The battle was rashly conducted as well as rashly begun, on the side of the Swedes, and it ended in their complete overthrow. Their infantry was almost destroyed. Six thousand Swedes were left on the field, a great number of prisoners were taken, among whom was Horn, and the whole of the Swedish guns, baggage, and 130 stand of colours, were captured. The expected reinforcements arrived at the close of the battle, too late to change the fortune of the day, but in time to prevent the defeat being converted into a total rout.
The power of Sweden in Germany seemed almost annihilated by this blow, and the news of the calamity caused Oxenstiern his second sleepless night. Nothing but the most indomitable energy could have carried him through the difficulties with which he was now beset.
The Elector of Saxony, at the best a doubtful ally, soon showed signs of not remaining an ally at all, or even a neutral. Uladislaus of Poland renewed his pretensions to the Swedish throne, and his attitude became more threatening from the circumstance that the truce concluded with Gustavus Adolphus, expired just at this time. Negotiations for the renewal of the truce were checked at the very outset, as Uladislaus, in his communications with the Regents, styled himself King of Sweden, and studiously avoided even the mention of Christina.
Other countries prepared to take advantage of the misfortunes of Sweden. The envoys of Brandenburg and England supported the Polish claims, and Charles the First promised to help Uladislaus in an attack on Sweden, although it is difficult to imagine such a course being actuated by any sound principles of policy.
France pretended a more friendly disposition, but secretly informed the Polish minister that, if better terms could not be obtained, Sweden would at least give up her possessions in Prussia. This faithless conduct had a different effect from what might have been expected. Uladislaus thought the Swedes were discouraged, and accordingly raised his own pretensions. He demanded the cession of Prussia, Liefland, and Estland, and that he should be proclaimed King of Sweden. During his absence, his brother, John Casimir, was to act as Regent, and his other brother and sister to receive the great fiefs of Finland and Ingermanland. Uladislaus raised some troops to support these extravagant pretensions; but he calculated a good deal on finding a party in Sweden favourable to his claims.
He bribed some students to distribute a letter, in which he spoke of his lawful title to the throne; he said that Sweden was now suffering from God's wrath on account of the usurpation of Duke Charles and of Gustavus Adolphus, and that the early death of the latter was a manifestation of the Divine displeasure. He then adverted to the heavy taxes under which the Swedes laboured, and told them that the only way to lighten these burthens was to call back their lawful King.
The arrogant demands of Uladislaus caused so much indignation in Sweden, that all negotiations would have been broken off if he had not altered his tone, and offered to renounce his claim to the Swedish throne on condition of receiving Liefland and Prussia. His demands, even thus modified, were rejected by the Council.
Oxenstiern sent some sharp remonstrances to the French minister who had betrayed his counsel; he threatened to leave Germany altogether to Austria, and to direct the whole force of Sweden against Poland, where he said more was to be won or lost.
To give effect to his threat, an army of twenty thousand men was with some difficulty equipped, and the command given to Jacob de la Gardie, whose name struck terror into an enemy so well acquainted with his prowess.
Additional contributions were necessary to pay this army; many of the nobility began to repent of the precedent they had given in paying taxes, but they were carried away by the enthusiasm of Gabriel Oxenstiern, who said in the Council that he would sell the plate from his table and the cap from his head to serve his country in this extremity.
An epidemic broke out in De la Gardie's army which induced the Swedish Council to make more concessions than they would otherwise have done, and it was finally agreed to cede Prussia to Poland.
It was stipulated that both Christina and Uladislaus should be called kings of Sweden, but that the latter should never rest any claim to possession on this title. Even when these terms were agreed upon by the two governments, they still could not determine upon a regular treaty of peace, but a truce was concluded for twenty-six years, from the 2nd of September, 1635.
Oxenstiern was as uncompromising as those old Roman Senators who increased their demands after each success of their enemy. He complained bitterly of a truce which he considered disgraceful to his country, and expressed himself so sharply to the Council, that the peaceful Gabriel Gustaf urged him to write them a conciliatory letter. The Chancellor refused to do this. He said, "He should be sorry if his old friend De la Gardie was displeased with his letter, that he meant nothing offensive to him, and did not even know that he had taken any part in the truce: still", the Chancellor added, "I cannot help it, for I consider the cause, and not persons."
Prussia always remained a sore subject with him. He often complained, both in his letters and speeches, that half the power and revenue of Sweden were lost when Prussia was alienated. He wrote to his son John, that "he grieved to outlive the day that Sweden forgot her great king's fame, and her own glory."
The truce cannot be considered very unfavourable, and certainly not disgraceful for Sweden. The only sacrifice she made was to give up a country to which she had very little claim. Her energies were taxed to the utmost in the war she had engaged in with Austria. The hostility of another powerful and warlike nation could hardly have failed to entail some disasters. It had required all the skill and ability of Gustavus Adolphus to conduct a war successfully against Poland, even when it stood alone.
On the other hand[,] Poland was already threatened with the revolt of the Cossacks, which produced a bloody civil war in 1648. The terms were, therefore, such as might be satisfactory to both parties; the only conditions on which a solid peace can be based.
In the meantime, Oxenstiern had made a treaty with France, by which that kingdom was engaged as a principal in the German war. Richelieu had contemplated this for some time, but while the Swedish arms were triumphant, Oxenstiern did not meet his advances with any cordiality.
The battle of Nordlingen made a great difference; even Oxenstiern began to doubt the power of Sweden to contend single-handed with the empire. Richelieu, whose great desire was to check Austria, would have been content to do so by subsidising Sweden. He now saw that it was necessary to throw the sword of France into the scale. The two great statesmen were, therefore, not disposed to lose time in vain endeavours to overreach one another. The illustrious Hugo Grotius had been sent to Paris early in 1635, as the Ambassador of Sweden; but the negotiations flagged in his hands. He was obnoxious to the French Minister because he had been recently in the service of France, where he had been badly treated. Richelieu at the first objected to him on the ground that Oxenstiern had not authority to appoint an ambassador, but the Chancellor reminded him that the authority which could make a treaty with France was sufficient to appoint an ambassador.
Richelieu made one attempt to deceive Grotius. He spread a report that France was about to make a separate treaty with the Emperor, but Grotius wrote to Oxenstiern, that this was a mere ruse, as in fact it turned out to be. Still, however, the treaty did not progress, either on account of the Cardinal's dislike to Grotius, or because the latter had not sufficiently explicit instructions. Oxenstiern resolved to see Richelieu himself, and arrived at Compiègne in April, 1635. The meeting of these two remarkable men was conducted with a degree of simplicity not very usual at that time. No time was lost in negotiations about precedence. The terms of the treaty were discussed, and the treaty itself signed in the short space of two days, and on the third day Oxenstiern took his leave.
By this treaty, France and Sweden agreed to carry on the war jointly against Austria; and each power engaged not to make peace without the other's consent. The independence of the German states was guaranteed. France agreed to pay an annual subsidy to Sweden, and to offer her mediation for the continuance of the truce with Poland. In return for this[,] Alsace was ceded to France.
Another stage of the Thirty Years' War was now passed. The ablest of the Imperial generals had been murdered by orders from Vienna, and his death had not the effect of encouraging the others, for there was afterwards a singular dearth of talent among the Austrian leaders. This deficiency became at last so marked, that the only man to be found who was not far below mediocrity was Menander [sic]; and to him, though a Protestant and a foreigner, was entrusted the defence of the Catholic cause, and of the Austrian Empire. Wallenstein, however, the greatest of the Imperial generals, well deserved his fate. He raised and commanded an army of mercenaries, who had no interest in the cause they espoused except the pay they received and the plunder they expected. Wallenstein's own character resembled that of his troops. His conduct was never directed by patriotism or honour, but solely by self-interest; and he seemed at last to have become quite bewildered with his own complicated intrigues. He carried on negotiations with the Swedes, and offered to unite with them to attack his master the Emperor, but Oxenstiern refused to trust a man with whom no engagement was binding. He said: "He who betrays his own country will betray any other." Even Bernhard of Weimar, not overscrupulous himself, refused to treat with one who had no respect for God or man. Wallenstein invited him to occupy Passau and Eger, and to join him at Pilsen.
It is a matter of conjecture whether Wallenstein was sincere in this offer, and if so[,] whether his intention was to join the Swedes, or whether he wished to unite with the other mercenary leader to form a party of their own; but Bernhard knew that he could not depend on him, and answered, that "no one can put faith in one who does not believe in God."
By a singular retribution, the traitor fell by treachery. Some Irish and Scotch mercenaries, who owed everything to him, murdered their benefactor, to obtain a larger reward than he could bestow.
The German Protestant princes have been blamed for their want of fidelity towards the Swedes, who came to save them from injury and oppression. At this distance of time we may form a juster opinion. The interests of the Swedes and of the German Protestant Princes agreed temporarily in one respect, in the desire to check the arbitrary power of Austria; but in every other respect their interests were diametrically opposed.
The German princes regarded the authority of a foreign Government with even greater jealousy than that of their own Emperor.
The Swedes soon showed that their chief object was the acquisition of territory in Germany; and, as the hereditary states of Austria were too far off, they sought to indemnify themselves at the expense of their allies. When they began to gain the ascendancy, they demanded a substantial reward in the cession of Pomerania, which belonged to Brandenburg. The Elector of Saxony justly feared that continued success might make them aspire to the possession of Dresden.
But if the German princes feared the ambition of Sweden nearly as much as that of Austria, whenever the terms of peace should be finally adjusted, there was absolutely no difference meanwhile in the amount of injury they suffered from the two great belligerents.
The commanders on each side ravaged the territory of friends and foes with perfect impartiality. Both armies were chiefly composed of mercenaries. These often changed sides, and the same towns were plundered by the same men, who alternately represented the lawful authority of Austria, or the religious freedom of Sweden.
Oxenstiern left Germany with the knowledge that the hostility of Saxony was impending; but he left in command of the Swedish army John Banér, a general formed in the school of Gustavus Adolphus, whom he is said to have resembled in person, and to have nearly equalled in military skill.
Above: Axel Oxenstierna.
Notes: Liefland = Livonia.
Estland = Estonia.
Ingermanland = Ingria.
Eger is the German name for Cheb, a town in what is now the Karlovy Vary region of the Czech Republic.
Pilsen is the German and English name for Plzeň, a city in what is now the Plzeň region of the Czech Republic.
No comments:
Post a Comment