Friday, September 26, 2025

An autistic monarch's maxims and aphorisms?: Possible traces of autism in the "pensées" of Kristina of Sweden

Source:

Bildt, Carl Daniel Nils, Baron, Pensées de Christine, reine de Suède (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1906)


Above: Kristina, painted by Jacob Ferdinand Voet, first half of the 1670s. In the collections of National Galleries Scotland, via Wikimedia Commons.

While I spent the middle months of this year (2025) making my way through and copying out Baron Carl Bildt's 1906 publication of Kristina's famous maxims and aphorisms (1,583 in all, "L'Ouvrage du Loisir" containing 1,139 and "Les Sentiments" containing 444 respectively), I thought back to the theory of her being autistic (which is very possible and plausible) and got the idea of, once I had them all posted here, eventually or someday making a select compilation of them where I've noticed some traces of autistic traits in their content and sentiments.

As the maxims and aphorisms, or "pensées" [literally "thoughts"], were all written in French, I will provide them each in the original language with an English translation underneath, and organised by the traits I have noticed. I have placed some of the individual maxims and aphorisms into multiple categories if I have seen fit.

Enjoy! (and, depending on who might be reading, I hope this isn't too much or too difficult to read.)

The excerpts:

Difficulty reading, comprehending and following, or conscious or unconscious disregard for, social cues, norms and rules:

"Pourquoi trouver étrange que les hommes blâment ce qui mérite de l'être?"

"Why is it found strange that men blame what deserves to be blamed?" (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 442 variant)

"On ne doit pas craindre d'offenser qui que ce soit quand il le faut."

"We should not fear offending anyone when necessary." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 443)

"Se hasarder à perdre d'amour d'un ami pour se conserver à la gloire et à la justice, c'est une action héroïque."

"To hazard losing the love of a friend in order to preserve one's glory and justice is a heroic action." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 473)

"Les hommes qui passent leur vie occupés entre un peigne et un miroir, ne la méritent pas."

"People who spend life occupied between a comb and a mirror do not deserve it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 587)

"Les deuils ne servent de rien aux morts et incommodent les vivants."

"Mourning clothes serve nothing to the dead and inconvenience the living." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 590)

"La vérité n'offense que les faibles et les sots."

"The truth only offends the weak and the foolish." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 869)

"On est obligé de dire la vérité, mais on n'est pas obligé de dire toutes les vérités."

"One is obliged to tell the truth, but one is not obliged to tell all truths." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 870)

"La bienséance est un tyran duquel on ne s'affranchit pas impunément."

"Propriety is a tyrant from which one cannot escape with impunity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 877)

"Désabuser les hommes des injustes et fausses opinions qu'ils ont, est une charité dangereuse."

"Disabusing men of the unjust and false opinions they have is a dangerous charity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1055)

"Le talent de la raillerie est d'autant plus dangereux, qu'il plaît à ceux qui l'ont; c'est plutôt un défaut qu'un talent. L'on s'en fait mille ennemis, et on ne s'en corrige pas que par une espèce de miracle."

"The talent for raillery [mockery] is all the more dangerous because it pleases those who have it; it is more of a defect than a talent. One makes a thousand enemies from it, and one can only correct oneself of it by some kind of miracle." (Les Sentiments, 228)

"Quand on a eu le malheur d'insulter à quelqu'un, il faut être prompt à donner satisfaction et en demander pardon; rien n'est plus grand que de rendre justice aux autres de soi-même."

"When we have had the misfortune of insulting someone, we must be quick to give satisfaction and ask forgiveness; nothing is greater than doing justice to others from oneself." (Les Sentiments, 235)

"Il y a des gens assez sots qui se rendent esclaves et martyrs de leurs habits et des modes. On est bien malheureux, quand on n'est occupé tout le temps de sa vie qu'entre un miroir et un peigne."

"There are some rather foolish people who make themselves slaves and martyrs to their clothes and fashions. One is very unhappy when one is occupied all one's life with nothing but a mirror and a comb." (Les Sentiments, 305)


Difficulty reading and understanding (mostly) neurotypical people and correctly judging and predicting their behaviours, sayings, doings, feelings, intentions, reactions, etc.:

"Les expressions des hommes ne signifient rien; à peine se peut-on fier à leurs actions."

"Men's expressions mean nothing; one can hardly trust their actions." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 174)

"L'on ne plaît aux hommes qu'en se transformant en eux."

"One only pleases men by transforming oneself into them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 229)

"L'intérêt et les passions violentes rendent les plus honnêtes gens injustes."

"Interest [self-interest] and violent passions make even the most honest people unjust." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 276)

"Il est aussi dangereux de faire du bien aux hommes, que de caresser les bêtes sauvages."

"It is as dangerous to do good to men as to caress wild beasts." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 277)

"L'on est haï de ceux auxquels on a fait du bien presqu'autant que de ceux à qui on a fait du mal."

"One is hated by those to whom one has done good almost as much as by those to whom one has done bad." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 278)

"On doit essuyer les injustices et l'ingratitude des hommes comme les orages."

"One must weather the injustices and ingratitude of men like storms." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 279)

"Le cœur humain est impénétrable."

"The human heart is impenetrable." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 331)

"L'hypocrisie et les bigots sont la ruine du monde."

"Hypocrisy and bigots are the ruin of the world." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 345)

"On n'a pas tort de haïr les fléaux du genre humain."

"We are not wrong to hate the scourges of the human race." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 374)

"Il est insupportable de voir estimer ceux qui ne le méritent pas."

"It is unbearable to see those be esteemed who do not deserve it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 390)

"Il faut s'accoutumer à voir passer les sots pour habiles, les poltrons pour braves et les scélérats pour des gens de bien; c'est être novice que de s'en fâcher."

"One must become accustomed to seeing fools pass for clever people, cowards for brave people, and scoundrels for good men; it is to be a novice to be angry at this." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 391)

"Avoir obligation à ceux qu'on n'estime pas, est une espèce de servitude fâcheuse."

"Having an obligation to those one does not esteem is a kind of irritating servitude." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 408)

"Tous les hommes ont leurs entêtements, et ils traitent de bagatelles celui des autres."

"All men have their stubbornness, and they treat other people's stubbornness as trifles." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 414)

"La constitution du monde et la malice des hommes engagent quelquefois à des résolutions qu'on déteste dans le cœur."

"The constitution of the world and the malice of men sometimes lead us to resolutions that we detest in our hearts." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 452)

"Exiger la justice des hommes, c'est mal connaître leur ignorance et leur malice."

"To demand justice from men is to badly know their ignorance and malice." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 458)

"Prétendre des hommes des services désintéressés, c'est se tromper."

"To expect service without self-interest from men is to deceive oneself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 459)

"On est trop sauvage en Italie dans le commerce de la vie, et ailleurs on est trop familier."

"In Italy people are too savage in the commerce of life, and elsewhere they are too familiar." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 481)

"Il faut savoir vivre avec les méchants sans se faire tort."

"One must know how to live with wicked people without doing oneself wrong." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 485)

"Les sentiments des hommes sont aussi différents que les visages."

"Men's feelings are as different as their faces." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 523)

"C'est une grande simplicité que de juger des sentiments d'autrui par les siens."

"It is a great simplicity to judge the feelings of others by one's own." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 524)

"Espérer plus de fidélité des autres que de soi-même, n'est plus sagesse."

"To expect more fidelity from others than from oneself is no more wisdom." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 858)

"Les hommes sont prêts à démentir leurs sens, leur raison et la vérité connue, pour flatter ceux qui commandent."

"Men are ready to deny their senses, their reason, and the known truth, to flatter those who command." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 871)

"L'ignorance et l'intérêt rendent les hommes injustes."

"Ignorance and interest [self-interest] make men unjust." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 872)

"Les préjugés empêchent de voir clair."

"Prejudices prevent us from seeing clearly." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 873)

"Plus un homme est sot, plus il est opiniâtre et inflexible."

"The more foolish a man is, the more stubborn and inflexible he is." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 875)

"Il n'y a pas de plus grands menteurs, que ceux qui font profession de ne mentir jamais."

"There are no greater liars than those who profess never to lie." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 876)

"L'hypocrisie est ce Protée qui prend mille figures; elle est ce caméléon qui se teint de mille couleurs."

"Hypocrisy is that Proteus who takes on a thousand forms; it is that chameleon which takes on a thousand colours." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1018)

"Désabuser les hommes des injustes et fausses opinions qu'ils ont, est une charité dangereuse."

"Disabusing men of the unjust and false opinions they have is a dangerous charity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1055)

"Les hommes aiment leurs entêtements plus que la vérité."

"Men love their stubbornnesses more than the truth." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1056)

"Les bigots s'inquiètent fort des péchés du prochain et ne se mettent guère en peine des leurs."

"Bigots worry greatly about the sins of their neighbours and hardly put themselves in pain about their own." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1085)

"L'extérieur des hommes impose. Il ne faut pas s'y fier."

"The exterior of men is imposing. It should not be trusted." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1095)

"Le peuple a été sot et superstitieux en tous les siècles et en toutes les religions. Il l'est et le sera toujours."

"People have been foolish and superstitious in all centuries and in all religions. They are and always will be." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1124)

"La philosophie ne change ni ne corrige pas les hommes."

"Philosophy neither changes nor corrects men." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1134)

"Les récompenses qu'on doit espérer des hommes, sont l'injustice, et l'ingratitude. Ils n'en ont point d'autres; ce sont les fruits d'ici-bas. La gloire et la félicité nous attendent dans le ciel."

"The rewards one should hope for from men are injustice and ingratitude. They have no others; they are the fruits of here below. Glory and felicity await us in Heaven." (Les Sentiments, 65)

"Les hommes ne seraient ni traîtres, ni menteurs, s'ils n'étaient faibles et sots."

"Men would be neither traitors nor liars if they were not weak and foolish." (Les Sentiments, 85)

"Quelque opinion qu'on ait de la probité des hommes, il ne s'y faut pas fier si fort qu'on ne doute jamais ni de ce qu'ils nous disent, ni de ce qu'ils font; car les hommes peuvent toujours ou être trompés, ou tromper, et s'ils ne nous manquent pas, ils peuvent nous manquer."

"Whatever opinion one may have of the probity [integrity] of men, one must not trust in it so strongly that one never doubts either what they say to us or what they do; for men can always either be deceived or deceive, and if they do not fail us, they can fail us." (Les Sentiments, 149)

"L'intérêt et les passions violentes rendent quelque fois les plus honnêtes gens du monde injustes et coupables, malgré eux-mêmes. Il faut tout pardonner; l'homme est un abîme de misère."

"Interest and violent passions sometimes make the most honest people in the world unjust and guilty, in spite of themselves. One must forgive everything; man is an abyss of misery." (Les Sentiments, 150)

"Dans la Cour, tout est suspect. Les caresses, les louanges et les bons offices mêmes ne se font quelquefois que pour nuire."

"At court, everything is suspect. Caresses [flattery], praise, and even good offices [services] are sometimes done only to harm." (Les Sentiments, 154)

"La plupart des hommes ne savent ni louer, ni blâmer avec justice; il faut avoir une très grande indifférence pour ce qu'ils disent de nous."

"Most men do not know how to praise or blame with justice; one must have great indifference to what they say about one." (Les Sentiments, 167)

"L'on compare des gens avec Alexandre le Grand qui méritent à peine d'être comparés à son Bucéphale."

"One compares people to Alexander the Great who hardly deserve to be compared to his Bucephalus." (Les Sentiments, 172; Bucephalus was Alexander's horse)

"L'amour des gens qu'on ne saurait aimer, importune furieusement."

"The love of people whom one cannot love importunes one furiously." (Les Sentiments, 201)

"On doit vivre avec les hommes comme avec les malades, desquels on souffre tout sans les croire déshonorés de tout ce qu'ils nous disent, ni de tout ce qu'ils font. On doit les aimer et en avoir pitié."

"We must live with people as with the sick, from whom we suffer everything without believing them to be dishonoured by everything they say or do. We must love them and have pity for them." (Les Sentiments, 231)

"C'est une espèce d'injustice d'espérer des hommes des services désintéressés, et comme il est rare d'en trouver, on ne doit jamais l'exiger."

"It is a kind of injustice to hope for disinterested services from men, and as it is rare to find it, one must never demand it." (Les Sentiments, 240)

"Il faut savoir toutes les malices des hommes sans être malicieux."

"One must be aware of all the malice of men without being malicious." (Les Sentiments, 271)

"C'est une grande erreur que de juger les sentiments des autres par les siens, surtout quand on les a nobles, généreux et grands."

"It is a great error to judge the feelings of others by one's own, especially when one's feelings are noble, generous and great." (Les Sentiments, 272)

"L'extérieur des hommes nous impose souvent; il ne faut pas s'y fier. Dieu seul ne se trompe jamais."

"The appearance of men often imposes us; we must not trust it. God alone is never deceived." (Les Sentiments, 309)


Emotional intensity and feeling things strongly:

"Les passions sont en elles-mêmes innocentes et naturelles."

"The passions are in themselves innocent and natural." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 360)

"Les passions sont le sel de la vie, qui est insipide sans elles."

"The passions are the salt of life, which is insipid without them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 361)

"L'on ne triomphe de ses passions, que lorsqu'elles sont faibles."

"One only triumphs over one's passions when they are weak." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 401)

"Le même tempérament, qui fait le grand mérite, assujettit aux grands défauts."

"The same temperament which creates great merit subjects one to great faults." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 665)

"Les passions sont le sel de la vie; on n'est heureux ni malheureux qu'à proportion qu'on les a violentes."

"The passions are the salt of life; one is happy or unhappy only in proportion to the violent ones one has." (Les Sentiments, 180)

"La colère est souvent juste, mais pas toujours innocente. La colère a ses plaisirs aussi bien que l'amour, mais on doit s'en rendre le maître par le secours du Ciel."

"Anger is often just, but not always innocent. Anger has its pleasures as well as love, but one must make oneself the master of them with the help of Heaven." (Les Sentiments, 186)


Hyperfocus/monotropism:

"Le grand secret de la vie est de se proposer un digne but et ne le perdre jamais de vue."

"The great secret of life is to set oneself a worthy goal and never lose sight of it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 145)

"C'est faire ce qu'on doit, que de s'occuper uniquement à ce que l'on fait."

"It is to do what one must to occupy oneself solely with what one does." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 463)

"Il faut s'occuper uniquement de ce qu'on fait."

"One must occupy oneself solely with what one does." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 463 variant)


Interoception issues and hyposensitivity to bodily signals (pain, hunger, thirst, tiredness, etc.; although it is involuntarily, Kristina seems to have noticed it and used it consciously to show and insist on her hardiness, stamina and strength):

"Plus on tourmente le corps, plus il se rend mutin."

"The more one torments the body, the more mutinous it makes itself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 81)

"On doit compter pour rien son corps, et vivre comme si on n'en avait pas."

"One must consider one's body as nothing and live as if one had none." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 593)

"Il faut conserver à l'âme un empire si absolu sur le corps, qu'il lui soit toujours soumis et jamais rebelle."

"The soul must preserve such an absolute empire over the body that it is always submissive to it and never rebellious." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 594)

"C'est une grande faiblesse que de ménager trop la santé. Il en faut jouir et la mettre à toute épreuve, mais surtout quand il est question de faire son devoir."

"It is a great weakness to manage one's health too much. One must enjoy it and put it to every test, but especially when it is a question of doing one's duty." (Les Sentiments, 262)

"Il ne faut pas qu'un honnête homme occupe un temps considérable ni à son manger, ni à son ajustement; un quart d'heure suffit pour cela dans les vingt-quatre heures. Pour le repos, trois ou quatre heures peuvent suffire à un homme occupé, quelquefois plus, quelquefois moins, selon la complexion et les affaires."

"An honest man should not spend considerable time eating or dressing; a quarter of an hour is sufficient for this in twenty-four hours. For rest, three or four hours may suffice for a busy man, sometimes more, sometimes less, depending on his complexion and affairs." (Les Sentiments, 306)

"La sobriété est un vertu su nécessaire à un honnête homme, qu'il ne peut presque être tel sans la posséder; on ne saurait être sage, sans être sobre; elle contribue fort à la santé de l'âme et du corps. Il ne faut manger que pour vivre, mais il ne faut pas vivre pour manger."

"Sobriety is a virtue so necessary to an honest man that he can hardly be such without possessing it; one cannot be wise without being sober; it contributes greatly to the health of the soul and the body. We must eat only to live, but we must not live to eat." (Les Sentiments, 414)


Love of and affinity with animals:

"Aimer les animaux, avoir de la charité pour eux, est la marque d'un bon naturel."

"To love animals, to have charity for them, is the mark of a good nature." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 895)

"Les animaux fournissent mille sujets de philosopher."

"Animals provide a thousand subjects for philosophising." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 896)

"Si les animaux avaient l'usage de la parole, ils convaincraient les hommes qu'ils ne sont guère moins bêtes qu'eux."

"If animals had the usage of words, they would convince men that they are hardly less beasts than themselves." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 898)


Masking/camouflaging/compensating for/internalising natural autistic traits, impulses, needs, emotional and/or social intensity, etc. (out of necessity on pain of negative consequences; but it should also be remembered that for Kristina masking or toning down her emotions in public would also have been an essential part of being a royal):

"On peut tromper tous les hommes, mais on ne peut se tromper soi-même."

"One can deceive all men, but one cannot deceive oneself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 56)

"Il faut savoir et parler et se taire."

"One must know how to speak and keep silent." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 104)

"Ne savoir pas dissimuler, c'est ne savoir pas vivre."

"Not knowing how to dissimulate is not knowing how to live." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 176)

"Se rendre tellement maître de sa langue et de son visage qu'ils ne trahissent jamais les secrets du cœur, est un art qu'il ne faut pas ignorer."

"To render oneself so much the master of one's tongue and face that they never betray the secrets of the heart is an art that one must not be ignorant of." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 204)

"La grande habileté ne consiste pas moins à faire paraître ses sentiments, qu'à les cacher à propos."

"Great cleverness consists no less in showing one's feelings than in hiding them appropriately." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 208)

"Tout homme qui ne sait pas dissimuler quand il veut, est un sot."

"Any man who does not know to dissimulate when he wants to is a fool." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 215)

"Le mépris des hommes et des choses empêchent quelquefois les plus habiles de dissimuler."

"Contempt for men and things sometimes prevents even the most clever men from dissimulating." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 216)

"On est obligé de connaître ses fautes sous peine de passer pour un sot."

"One is obliged to know one's faults under pain of passing for a fool." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 225)

"L'on ne plaît aux hommes qu'en se transformant en eux."

"One only pleases men by transforming oneself into them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 229)

"La défiance de soi-même est une espèce de sagesse."

"Distrust of oneself is a kind of wisdom." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 328)

"La constitution du monde et la malice des hommes engagent quelquefois à des résolutions qu'on déteste dans le cœur."

"The constitution of the world and the malice of men sometimes lead us to resolutions that we detest in our hearts." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 452)

"Quelque mépris que l'on ait pour les hommes et pour les choses, il faut agir dans l'extérieur comme si on en était touché."

"Whatever contempt one has for men and things, one must act outwardly as if one were touched by them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 591)

"Se vaincre, c'est triompher du plus puissant de ses ennemis."

"To vanquish oneself is to triumph over the most powerful of one's enemies." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 698)

"La plus grande victoire est celle qu'on remporte sur soi-même."

"The greatest victory is that which one wins over oneself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 698 variant)

"On ne doit jamais être satisfait de soi-même, quelque satisfaits qu'en paraissent les autres."

"One should never be satisfied with oneself, however satisfied with one others may appear." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 766)

"Il faut tâcher de se surpasser toujours; cette occupation doit durer autant que la vie."

"One must always strive to surpass oneself; this occupation should last as long as one's life." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 768)

"Il faut tâcher de savoir tout, mais il ne faut pas témoigner toujours de le savoir."

"One must try to know everything, but one must not always testify knowledge of everything." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 866)

"On est obligé de dire la vérité, mais on n'est pas obligé de dire toutes les vérités."

"One is obliged to tell the truth, but one is not obliged to tell all truths." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 870)

"La bienséance est un tyran duquel on ne s'affranchit pas impunément."

"Propriety is a tyrant from which one cannot escape with impunity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 877)

"Combattre et souffrir ses défauts jusqu'à la mort, sont les occupations de toute la vie."

"Fighting and suffering one's faults until death are the occupations of one's entire life." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1000)

"On ne peut se déguiser ni à Dieu ni à soi-même."

"One cannot disguise oneself from God or from oneself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1004)

"Désabuser les hommes des injustes et fausses opinions qu'ils ont, est une charité dangereuse."

"Disabusing men of the unjust and false opinions they have is a dangerous charity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1055)

"Il faut tâcher d'être effectivement ce que l'on veut paraître."

"One must try to effectively be what one wants to appear as." (Les Sentiments, 86)

"Il est plus facile de tromper les autres que nous-mêmes sur notre propre sujet."

"It is easier to deceive others than ourselves about ourselves." (Les Sentiments, 91)

"Il faut que les princes étudient surtout le grand livre du monde. Il faut qu'ils sachent lire dans le front des hommes, et jusque dans leurs cœurs, leurs sentiments que l'intérêt et la flatterie leur cachent avec tant de soin. Cette science est rare, Dieu la donne à peu de gens; mais ceux qui l'ont, sont faits pour régner."

"Princes must, above all, study the great book of the world. They must know how to read men's faces, and even their hearts, their feelings that interest and flattery hide from them with so much care. This science is rare, God gives it to few people; but those who do have it are made to reign." (Les Sentiments, 134)

"La colère est souvent juste, mais pas toujours innocente. La colère a ses plaisirs aussi bien que l'amour, mais on doit s'en rendre le maître par le secours du Ciel."

"Anger is often just, but not always innocent. Anger has its pleasures as well as love, but one must make oneself the master of them with the help of Heaven." (Les Sentiments, 186)

"La discrétion est une vertu qui assaisonne toutes les autres."

"Discretion is a virtue that seasons all the others." (Les Sentiments, 187)

"Le talent de la raillerie est d'autant plus dangereux, qu'il plaît à ceux qui l'ont; c'est plutôt un défaut qu'un talent. L'on s'en fait mille ennemis, et on ne s'en corrige pas que par une espèce de miracle."

"The talent for raillery [mockery] is all the more dangerous because it pleases those who have it; it is more of a defect than a talent. One makes a thousand enemies from it, and one can only correct oneself of it by some kind of miracle." (Les Sentiments, 228)

"La véritable générosité et le vrai courage consistent à souffrir et à dissimuler les injures, et non pas à les venger."

"True generosity and true courage consist in suffering and dissembling injuries, and not in avenging them." (Les Sentiments, 232)

"Il faut être persuadé qu'il vaut mieux souffrir les insultes et les injustices, que de les faire aux autres."

"We must be persuaded that it is better to suffer insults and injustices than to do them to others." (Les Sentiments, 234)

"Il y a des choses qu'il ne faut ni faire, ni dire; il y en a qu'il faut faire et ne dire pas; il y en a qu'il faut dire et ne faire pas; il y en a qu'il faut et dire et faire sans y balancer."

"There are things one must neither do nor say; there are things one must do and not say; there are things one must say and not do; there are things one must both say and do without hesitation." (Les Sentiments, 332)


Need for and insistence on sameness:

"Les habitudes rendent la vie honnête et agréable; l'on ne peut s'en passer."

"Habits make life honest and agreeable; one cannot do without them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 480)


Other/miscellaneous:

"Dire souvent: «je ne sais», ne fait honte à personne."

"Often saying 'I don't know' shames no one." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 606)

"L'inconstance, qui est un défaut, est souvent un mérite."

"Inconstancy, which is a fault, is often a merit." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 669)

"L'inconstance n'est pas toujours un grand défaut. Elle est souvent une grande vertu."

"Inconstancy is not always a great fault. It is often a great virtue." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 669 variant)

"La patience est la vertu de ceux qui manquent ou de courage ou de force."

"Patience is the virtue of those who lack either courage or strength." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 919)

"La solitude est l'élément des grands esprits."

"Solitude is the element of great minds." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1100)

"On peut et l'on doit régler ses désirs, mais on ne saurait régler ses nécessités."

"One can and one must regulate one's desires, but one cannot regulate one's needs." (Les Sentiments, 59)

"On ne saurait ni aimer, ni respecter ce qu'on n'estime pas."

"One can neither love nor respect what one does not esteem." (Les Sentiments, 145)


Overwhelm, overstimulation and burnout:

"Le plus grand des malheurs est d'être engagé dans un état au-dessus de ses forces."

"The greatest misfortune is to be engaged in a state beyond one's strength." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 655)


Persistent drive for autonomy (a.k.a. pathological demand avoidance, PDA):

"On est plus heureux pour n'obéir à personne que pour commander au monde."

"One is happier obeying no one than ruling the world." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 469)


Rigid thinking:

"Le grand secret de la vie est de se proposer un digne but et ne le perdre jamais de vue."

"The great secret of life is to set oneself a worthy goal and never lose sight of it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 145)

"Il faut vouloir fortement tout ce que l'on veut."

"One must strongly want everything one wants." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 462)


Sensory sensitivities:

"En matière d'habits, tout ce qui pèse et embarrasse n'orne pas."

"In matters of clothing, anything that is heavy and which burdens one does not adorn one." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 589)


Special interests (Kristina's were rulers and philosophers of antiquity (especially Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great and Cyrus the Great), philosophy, alchemy, etc.) and extensive knowledge of the subjects of those interests/infodumping about them:

"César au bord du Rubicon raisonna juste. Il vit en ce moment tout ce qu'il pouvait espérer et tout ce qu'il devait craindre; mais le sort en était jeté, il fallait le passer; la gloire et la fortune l'attendaient à l'autre bord; c'était fait de lui s'il leur eût tourné le dos. Il fallait périr ou régner."

"Caesar on the banks of the Rubicon reasoned correctly. He saw at that moment everything he could hope for and everything he should fear; but the die was cast, he had to cross; glory and fortune awaited him on the other side; it would have been all over for him if he had turned his back on them. He had to either perish or rule." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 126)

"Parmi les philosophes Socrate, Platon, Aristote, Diogène, Épicure, et Épictète méritent l'admiration."

"Among the philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Diogenes, Epicurus and Epictetus deserve admiration." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 130)

"Ceux qui accusent Épicure d'avoir été voluptueux seraient plus chastes qu'ils ne sont, et mourraient de faim, s'ils vivaient comme lui."

"Those who accuse Epicurus of having been voluptuous [hedonistic] would be more chaste than they are, and they would starve to death if they lived like him." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 131)

"Platon et Aristote étaient deux grands philosophes, mais d'un caractère très différent. Platon semble n'avoir travaillé que pour la gloire de son maître; Aristote, ingrat et malhonnête, n'a jamais parlé ni de son maître, ni de son disciple."

"Plato and Aristotle were two great philosophers, but of very different characters. Plato seems to have worked only for the glory of his master; Aristotle, ungrateful and dishonest, never spoke of either his master or his disciple." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 132)

"Selon Aristippe, tout est permis aux sages."

"According to Aristippus, everything is permitted to the wise." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 513)

"Platon dans les fers était plus prince que son tyran."

"Plato in iron chains was a greater prince than his tyrant." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 648)

"César, prisonnier entre les mains des pirates, les gourmanda jusqu'à les menacer de les faire pendre."

"Caesar, held prisoner by the pirates, scolded them to the point of threatening to have them hanged." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 652)

"Après la bataille de Pharsale, César, étant seul dans la chaloupe, rangea à son obéissance le même Cassius qui commandait une puissante armée navale et qui depuis le poignarda sur le trône au milieu du sénat. Ces actions méritent de la réflexion et de l'admiration."

"After the Battle of Pharsalus, Caesar, alone in the shallop, brought to his knees the same Cassius who commanded a powerful naval force and who later stabbed him on the throne in the midst of the Senate. These actions deserve reflection and admiration." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 653)

"Alexandre, avec tous ses défauts, a été le plus grand des hommes."

"Alexander, with all his faults, was the greatest of men." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 776)

"Les caractères d'Alexandre et de César sont différents, mais ils étaient tous deux admirables."

"The characters of Alexander and Caesar are different, but they were both admirable." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 778)

"Si Alexandre pouvait ressusciter, le surnom de Grand, qu'il avait si bien mérité, lui ferait honte."

"If Alexander could be resurrected, the name 'the Great', which he had so well deserved, would shame him." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 799; Kristina did not much approve of her contemporary and fellow monarch, King Louis XIV of France, and assumed Alexander would feel the same towards him.)

"On n'a rien à pardonner au grand Cyrus. C'est le seul des hommes extraordinaires sur lequel il n'y a pas de prise."

"One has nothing to forgive the great Cyrus for. He is the only extraordinary man over whom there is no hold." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 805)

"Alexandre et César étaient grands et incomparables, mais ils avaient de grands défauts qu'il faut pardonner à leur mérite extraordinaire."

"Alexander and Caesar were great and incomparable, but they had great faults that must be forgiven for their extraordinary merit." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 806)

"Alexandre est aussi grand et aussi glorieux par les royaumes qu'il a donnés, que par ceux qu'il a conquis."

"Alexander is as great and as glorious for the kingdoms he gave as for those he conquered." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 815)

"Les reproches que fit Crésus à Cyrus sur ses grandes profusions, n'empêchèrent pas le vainqueur de l'Asie d'être libéral; mais c'est se tromper que de compter, comme il fit, sur la reconnaissance des hommes."

"The reproaches Croesus leveled at Cyrus for his great extravagance did not prevent the conqueror of Asia from being liberal; but it was a mistake to count, as he did, on the gratitude of men." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 839)

"Alexandre, après avoir tout donné, ne se réserva que l'espérance, qui est aussi trompeuse que la reconnaissance."

"Alexander, after having given everything, reserved for himself only hope, which is as deceptive as gratitude." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 840)

"La philosophie ne change ni ne corrige pas les hommes."

"Philosophy neither changes nor corrects men." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1134)

"J'estime Cyrus, Alexandre, les deux Scipions, César, Almansor, parce qu'il me semble que leurs âmes étaient encore plus grandes que leur grande fortune."

"I esteem Cyrus, Alexander, the two Scipios, Caesar, and Almanzor, because it seems to me that their souls were even greater than their great fortune." (Les Sentiments, 34)

"On accuse César comme d'un crime de s'être rendu maître de Rome; mais il me semble qu'on a tort, car pouvait-il rendre un plus grand et plus important service à Rome que de se daigner de lui commander?"

"One accuses Caesar, as a crime, of having taken control of Rome; but it seems to me that one is wrong, for what greater and more important service could he have rendered to Rome than to deign to command it?" (Les Sentiments, 112)

"Ceux qui tuèrent César, firent plus de mal à Rome que ne firent Sylla, Marius, ni le Triumvirat; et la mort de César fut le plus grand de ses malheurs."

"Those who killed Caesar did more harm to Rome than Sulla, Marius, or the Triumvirate; and Caesar's death was the greatest of his misfortunes." (Les Sentiments, 113)

"L'on ne saurait pardonner à Brutus le meurtre de César; à cela près c'était un grand et honnête homme que Brutus."

"One cannot forgive Brutus for the murder of Caesar; except that Brutus was a great and honest man." (Les Sentiments, 114)

"Parmi les philosophes, Socrate, Aristippe et Diogène sont fort à mon gré; je ne voudrais pourtant pas être faite comme eux."

"Among the philosophers, Socrates, Aristippus, and Diogenes are very much to my liking; I would not, however, want to be made like them." (Les Sentiments, 120)

"C'est au prix de terribles travaux et [de] bien des sueurs et de sang répandu, qu'Alexandre et peu d'autres ont mérité leurs grands noms."

"It was at the cost of terrible labours, much sweat and bloodshed that Alexander and few others earned their great names." (Les Sentiments, 169)

"L'on compare des gens avec Alexandre le Grand qui méritent à peine d'être comparés à son Bucéphale."

"One compares people to Alexander the Great who hardly deserve to be compared to his Bucephalus." (Les Sentiments, 172)

"Quand on considère que ces grands hommes ont vécu et sont morts, sans que leurs grands noms fussent connus de la centième partie du monde, et qu'ils ont été si inconnus à tout le reste, qu'il ignorait qu'ils fussent nés, que même cette partie du monde qui les a connus les a oubliés, comme s'ils n'eussent jamais été, cette réflexion me semble capable de guérir tout homme raisonnable de la vaine espérance d'une immortalité imaginaire."

"If Caesar, Alexander and Cyrus once succeeded in becoming masters of a part of the world, it was because they possessed all the necessary qualities in a heroic respect, and because the world was then in a very different state from that of our century; I am persuaded that at present, with all their great qualities and good fortune, they would not succeed." (Les Sentiments, 387)

"Auguste avait raison de s'étonner qu'Alexandre trouvait moins de plaisir à gouverner, qu'a [sic] conquérir cette belle partie du monde dont il s'était rendu le maître."

"Augustus was right to be astonished that Alexander found less pleasure in governing than in conquering this beautiful part of the world, of which he had made himself master." (Les Sentiments, 390)

"Alexandre fit quelque chose de plus indigne de lui en faisant mourir Parménion de sang froid, que Clitus dans son emportement, et on doit pardonner plutôt à sa colère qu'à sa crainte qui était plus indigne de lui."

"Alexander did something more unworthy of himself in killing Parmenion in cold blood than Cleitus in his rage, and his anger should be forgiven rather than his fear, which was more unworthy of him." (Les Sentiments, 391)

"Il y a des actions dans la vie d'Alexandre qui ternissent fort sa gloire; celle d'avoir fait tailler en pièces contre sa parole donnée une garnison qui sortait d'une place, d'avoir fait mourir cruellement un brave homme pour s'être défendu vaillamment dans sa place, celle d'avoir fait tailler en pièces les prisonniers pour n'être pas embarassé d'eux dans une marche, d'avoir fait mourir ce pauvre Persan innocent, sur le témoignage d'un bouffon, d'avoir brûlé cruellement le plus beau palais et une des plus belles villes de l'Asie à la persuasion d'une courtisane, d'avoir sacrifié aux mânes d'Ephestion un peuple entier, comme il fit, d'avoir fait périr le philosophe Callisthène mangé de la vermine dans une prison, d'avoir exposé Lysimachus aux lions, d'avoir donné des pris aux plus grands buveurs de son armée; toutes ces actions sont barbares, horribles, inexcusables et tout à fait indignes d'Alexandre, qu'on accuse de plus d'avoir été lui-même ivrogne et fanfaron, défauts tout à fait indignes d'un honnête homme, et d'un grand prince: je crois peut-être qu'on lui fait tort en l'accusant de tant de crimes et défauts, mais enfin voilà autant de taches au soleil qui ne l'empêchent pas d'être ce qu'il est, puisqu'il est d'ailleurs si grand qu'on doit presque lui pardonner et se souvenir qu'il était homme. Cependant tous ces défauts et crimes ne sont presque pas remarqués; on blâme Alexandre uniquement de la mort de Clitus, dont je ne le loue pas, mais je l'en excuse fort, parce que Clitus le força de faire ce qu'il fit. Tout ceci ne se dit que pour faire remarquer l'injustice des hommes, qui ne savent ce qu'il faut ni louer, ni blâmer."

"There are actions in Alexander's life that greatly tarnish his glory; that of having cut to pieces a garrison that was leaving a place against his word, of having cruelly put to death a brave man for having defended himself valiantly in his place, that of having cut to pieces the prisoners so as not to be embarrassed by them in a march, of having put to death this poor innocent Persian, on the testimony of a buffoon, of having cruelly burned down the most beautiful palace and one of the most beautiful cities of Asia at the persuasion of a courtesan, of having sacrificed to the spirit of Hephaestion an entire people, as he did, of having caused the philosopher Callisthenes to perish by eating vermin in a prison, of having exposed Lysimachus to the lions, of having given prizes to the greatest drinkers of his army. All these actions are barbaric, horrible, inexcusable and completely unworthy of Alexander, who is further accused of having been a drunkard and a braggart himself, faults completely unworthy of an honest man and a great prince. I perhaps believe that one does him wrong by accusing him of so many crimes and faults, but after all, these are so many spots in the sun that do not prevent him from being what he is, since he is so great that one should almost forgive him and remember that he was a man. However, all these faults and crimes are almost unnoticed; Alexander is blamed solely for the death of Cleitus, for which I do not praise him, but I greatly excuse him, because Cleitus forced him to do what he did. All this is said only to point out the injustice of men, who do not know what to praise or blame." (Les Sentiments, 392)

"Outre tout cela, on blâme encore Alexandre de s'être voulu faire adorer comme fils de Jupiter; ceux qui l'en blâment ne considèrent pas le siècle d'Alexandre, ni cette espèce d'adoration, qui a fait crier tant de gens: il naquit en un siècle où on donnait la qualité de dieux et de fils de Jupiter à tant de gens qui n'étaient pas si dignes de l'être que lui. Je l'excuse donc s'il s'était attribué une qualité, dont il s'était rendu si digne; même je suis persuadée qu'il n'en croyait rien lui-même, mais il se servait habilement de la superstition de son siècle pour pousser ses grands desseins, et le fit bien connaître quand il dit lui-même que tous les honnêtes gens étaient fils de Jupiter, et que le sang que répandaient ses plaies n'est pas cette liqueur dont Homère parle, qui coule des dieux. Pour l'adoration qu'il voulait qu'on usât envers lui, dont les vieux Macédoniens murmuraient si fort, il me semble qu'Alexandre avait raison, et eux avaient tort; la coutume d'adorer les rois était aussi ancienne dans tout l'Orient, qu'elle était nouvelle parmi les Grecs; Alexandre, qui s'était rendu maître de la monarchie de Perse, avait grande raison de changer son cérémoniel et de s'accomoder aux mœurs des peuples qu'il avait conquis, parce qu'il était et plus respectueux et plus digne de sa fortune; aussi n'y avait-il parmi les Grecs que les barbons et les pédants qui en murmuraient; le reste s'y accommoda sagement, et fit très bien, car on ne saurait trop honorer et respecter les rois. Ces respects qu'il se faisait porter, ne rendaient pas Alexandre moins familier, ni moins tendre à ses amis, ce qu'il fit bien connaître quand il arracha le bandeau de son front pour bander les blessures d'un des siens; enfin je ne vois pas qu'en cela il fût plus criminel que le sont les autres rois, qui se font servir à genoux parmi nous, et qui méritent cet honneur bien moins que lui."

"Besides all this, one also blames Alexander for having wanted to make himself adored as the son of Jupiter; those who blame him for this do not consider Alexander's century, nor this kind of adoration, which has caused so many people to cry out: he was born in a century when the status of gods and sons of Jupiter was given to so many people who were not as worthy of being so as he was. I therefore excuse him if he had attributed to himself a quality of which he had made himself so worthy; I myself am persuaded that he did not believe it himself, but he skillfully served himself of the superstition of his century to push his grand designs, and he made it well known when he himself said that all honest people were sons of Jupiter, and that the blood shed by his wounds is not that liquour of which Homer speaks, which flows from the gods. As for the adoration he wanted to be shown him, about which the ancient Macedonians murmured so loudly, it seems to me that Alexander was right, and they were wrong; the custom of worshipping kings was as ancient throughout the East as it was new among the Greeks; Alexander, who had become master of the Persian monarchy, had great reason to change his ceremonial and to accommodate himself to the customs of the peoples he had conquered, because it was both more respectful and more worthy of his fortune; so among the Greeks there were only the greybeards and the pedants who murmured about it; the rest accommodated themselves wisely, and did very well, for one cannot honour and respect kings too much. These respects he made be shown to himself did not make Alexander any less familiar or any less tender towards his friends, a fact he made clear when he tore the band from his forehead to bandage the wounds of one of his own. In short, I do not see that in this he was any more criminal than other kings, who make themselves served on one's knees among us, and who deserve this honour much less than he." (Les Sentiments, 393; Jupiter is the Latin name and equivalent for the Greek god Zeus.)

"Les vies de Cyrus et de César étaient plus réglées et plus sages. Ils étaient aussi grands qu'Alexandre, mais ils se possédaient mieux. Tamerlan et Almansor étaient aussi grands que tous ces gens là, mais Almansor occupait trop de temps en des bagatelles qui sont indignes d'un prince. On lit avec plaisir et grand profit les belles vies de ces grands hommes."

"The lives of Cyrus and Caesar were more orderly and wiser. They were as great as Alexander, but they had better self-possession. Tamerlane and Almanzor were as great as all these men, but Almanzor occupied too much time with trifles that are unworthy of a prince. One reads with pleasure and great profit the beautiful lives of these great men." (Les Sentiments, 394)

"Je suis persuadé[e] que l'histoire de Tomyris est une fable, et je crois que Cyrus est mort dans son lit comblé d'âge et de gloire, de la manière que Xénophon raconte sa mort, et quand même ce roman de Tomyris serait vrai, je ne vois pas pourquoi une action si barbare ait acquis tant de réputation à une femme de qui on ignore tout hors, cette détestable action de vengeance, qui devrait rendre sa mémoire abominable et odieuse à toute la postérité. On doit respecter le mérite dans les ennemis mêmes, qu'ils soient vifs ou morts."

"I am persuaded that the story of Tomyris is a fable, and I believe that Cyrus died in his bed, full of age and glory, in the manner Xenophon recounts his death. Even if this romance of Tomyris were true, I do not see why such a barbaric action should have acquired such a reputation for a woman about whom nothing is known except for this detestable act of revenge, which should make her memory abominable and odious to all posterity. One must respect merit even in enemies, whether living or dead." (Les Sentiments, 399)

"Epictète plus, sage, né esclave, s'y conserva et s'y rendit si illustre qu'il a rendu ses fers plus glorieux, que bien d'autres n'ont rendu leurs sceptres. Toutefois on ne peut pardonner à ce philosophe esclave la patience qu'il eut avec son brutal de maître, qui pour se divertir lui rompit une jambe. Pour moi, je lui aurais cassé la tête à la barbe de la philosophie."

"Epictetus, wiser, born a slave, preserved himself there and became so illustrious that he surrendered his chains more gloriously than many others have surrendered their scepters. However, one cannot forgive this philosopher-slave for the patience he had with his brute of a master, who, to divert himself, broke one of his legs. For myself, I would have smashed his head in under the beard of philosophy." (Les Sentiments, 437)


Stimming and repetitive actions, thoughts, interests and behaviours:

"Les habitudes rendent la vie honnête et agréable; l'on ne peut s'en passer."

"Habits make life honest and agreeable; one cannot do without them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 480)


Strong emotional torments, pain and confusion:

"Il est plus difficile de pardonner à soi-même qu'aux autres."

"It is more difficult to forgive oneself than others." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 495)


Strong love of and adherence to truth and honesty:

"La seule vérité persuade et ne trompe jamais."

"Truth alone persuades and never deceives." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 54)

"Il faut aimer la justice et la vérité autant que la vie."

"One must love justice and truth as much as life." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 141)

"Quand on est né pour la vérité, on la démêle parmi mille mensonges."

"When one is born for the truth, one unravels it among a thousand lies." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 142)

"La faiblesse et l'ignorance rendent les hommes ennemis de la vérité."

"Weakness and ignorance make men enemies of the truth." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 143)

"La vérité a un certain caractère, qui la distingue d'une manière inexplicable."

"Truth has a certain character that distinguishes it in an inexplicable way." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 173)

"Manquer de parole est plutôt lâcheté qu'habileté."

"Breaking one's word is more cowardice than cleverness." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 219)

"L'hypocrisie et les bigots sont la ruine du monde."

"Hypocrisy and bigots are the ruin of the world." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 345)

"La vérité n'offense que les faibles et les sots."

"The truth only offends the weak and the foolish." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 869)

"On est obligé de dire la vérité, mais on n'est pas obligé de dire toutes les vérités."

"One is obliged to tell the truth, but one is not obliged to tell all truths." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 870)

"Il faut être toujours du parti de la vérité et de la justice."

"One must always be on the side of truth and justice." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 874)

"Les hommes aiment leurs entêtements plus que la vérité."

"Men love their stubbornnesses more than the truth." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1056)


Strong love of reading:

"Il faut lire pour s'instruire, pour se corriger et pour se consoler."

"One must read to instruct oneself, to correct oneself and to console oneself." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 151)

"La lecture est une partie du devoir de l'honnête homme."

"Reading is part of the duty of an honest man." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 152)

"L'oracle qui ordonna de consulter les morts, parla sans doute des livres."

"The oracle who ordered that the dead be consulted was undoubtedly speaking of books." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 153)

"La lecture plaît à ceux qui ont quelque sympathie avec les grands génies de l'antiquité."

"Reading pleases those who have some sympathy with the great geniuses of antiquity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 156)

"Ceux qui n'aiment pas la lecture, se privent du plus utile des plaisirs."

"Those who do not love reading are depriving themselves of the most useful of pleasures." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 572)

"La lecture charme les maux, elle console des malheurs."

"Reading charms evils, it consoles misfortunes." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 575)

"Il est du devoir d'un prince de donner quelques moments de son temps à la lecture de bons livres. Les moments ne sont pas perdus pour le public, car ils corrigent et instruisent les princes. Il faut savoir dérober ces moments à son repos, à sa nourriture, à ses divertissements et plaisirs, mais non pas à ses affaires, ni à son devoir."

"It is the duty of a prince to devote a few moments of his time to reading good books. These moments are not lost for the public, for they correct and instruct princes. One must know how to rob these moments from one's rest, from one's nourishment, from one's divertisements [entertainments] and pleasures, but not from one's affairs or from one's duty." (Les Sentiments, 133)


Strong sense of justice, and/or justice sensitivity:

"Se venger en protégeant les oppressés, est une noble et glorieuse vengeance."

"To avenge oneself in protecting the oppressed is a noble and glorious vengeance." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 25)

"Quand une bonne action rendrait malheureux pour le reste de la vie, on ne doit ni s'en abstenir, ni s'en repentir jamais."

"When a good action would make one unhappy for the rest of one's life, one must neither abstain from it nor ever repent of it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 148)

"Il faut pardonner aux amis et aux ennemis tout ce qui est pardonnable."

"One must forgive friends and enemies for everything that is forgivable." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 200)

"Il ne faut punir que ceux qu'on ne saurait corriger."

"One should only punish those who cannot be corrected." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 202)

"Tout homme qui confesse sa faute et en demande pardon le mérite."

"Every man who confesses his fault and asks for forgiveness deserves it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 316)

"Il faut tout pardonner à ceux qui ont l'esprit et le cœur grand."

"Those who have a great mind and heart must be forgiven for everything." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 318)

"On n'a pas tort de haïr les fléaux du genre humain."

"We are not wrong to hate the scourges of the human race." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 374)

"Il est insupportable de voir estimer ceux qui ne le méritent pas."

"It is unbearable to see those be esteemed who do not deserve it." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 390)

"Il faut s'accoutumer à voir passer les sots pour habiles, les poltrons pour braves et les scélérats pour des gens de bien; c'est être novice que de s'en fâcher."

"One must become accustomed to seeing fools pass for clever people, cowards for brave people, and scoundrels for good men; it is to be a novice to be angry at this." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 391)

"Il est juste de blâmer ce qui mérite d'être blâmé."

"It is just to blame what deserves to be blamed." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 442)

"Pourquoi trouver étrange que les hommes blâment ce qui mérite de l'être?"

"Why is it found strange that men blame what deserves to be blamed?" (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 442 variant)

"On ne doit pas craindre d'offenser qui que ce soit quand il le faut."

"We should not fear offending anyone when necessary." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 443)

"Mépriser les injures, c'est s'en venger."

"To despise injuries is to avenge oneself for them." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 454)

"Se hasarder à perdre d'amour d'un ami pour se conserver à la gloire et à la justice, c'est une action héroïque."

"To hazard losing the love of a friend in order to preserve one's glory and justice is a heroic action." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 473)

"Il faut savoir vivre avec les méchants sans se faire tort."

"One must know how to live with wicked people without doing oneself wrong." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 485)

"Refuser au mérite les applaudissements qui lui sont dûs, est une espèce d'injustice."

"To refuse merit the applause it deserves is a kind of injustice." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 687)

"Punir et récompenser ceux qui le méritent, sont les parties essentielles de la justice et de la politique."

"Punishing and rewarding those who deserve it are essential parts of justice and politics." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 817)

"Tout est pardonnable, excepté la désobéissance et l'infidélité."

"Everything is forgivable, except disobedience and infidelity." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 845)

"L'ignorance et l'intérêt rendent les hommes injustes."

"Ignorance and interest [self-interest] make men unjust." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 872)

"Il faut être toujours du parti de la vérité et de la justice."

"One must always be on the side of truth and justice." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 874)

"Il faut payer le mal avec le bien, sans faire tort à la justice."

"One must repay evil with good, without doing wrong to justice." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 908)

"Les misérables et les malheureux méritent du secours."

"The miserable and the unfortunate deserve succour." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 938)

"Les bigots s'inquiètent fort des péchés du prochain et ne se mettent guère en peine des leurs."

"Bigots worry greatly about the sins of their neighbours and hardly put themselves in pain about their own." (L'Ouvrage du Loisir, 1085)

"Il faut punir dans la forme de justice quand on peut; mais quand on ne peut pas, il faut toujours punir comme on peut."

"One must punish with justice when one can; but when one cannot, one must always punish as one can." (Les Sentiments, 160)

"Il faut laisser rarement impunis ceux qui méritent de l'être."

"Those who deserve it should rarely go unpunished." (Les Sentiments, 161)

"Il faut mieux pourtant pardonner aux coupables que de punir les innocents."

"It is, however, better to forgive the guilty than to punish the innocent." (Les Sentiments, 162)

"On doit le pardon à tout homme qui confesse sa faute et se rend à discrétion."

"Forgiveness is due to every man who confesses his fault and renders himself to discretion." (Les Sentiments, 163)

"On doit haïr l'injustice et les crimes, sans haïr ni les injustes ni les criminels."

"One must hate injustice and crime, without hating either the unjust or the criminal." (Les Sentiments, 184)

"On doit punir sans colère et sans injustice."

"One must punish without anger and without injustice." (Les Sentiments, 185)

"Personne ne se croit déshonoré pour avoir reçu un coup de pied d'un cheval, ni d'un âne, et il faudrait avoir le même mépris pour ceux qui nous insultent, de quelque manière que ce soit."

"No one believes himself dishonoured by having received a kick from a horse or an ass [a donkey], and we should have the same contempt for those who insult us, in any way whatsoever." (Les Sentiments, 233)

"L'impossibilité d'exécuter une promesse, ou son injustice, peuvent dispenser de l'accomplir, et c'est en ces occasions que l'on s'en peut dispenser, sans être digne de blâme."

"The impossibility of executing a promise, or its injustice, can dispense one from accomplishing it, and it is on these occasions that one can dispense oneself from it without being worthy of blame." (Les Sentiments, 258)

"Hors de là, nul intérêt, ni nul avantage, ne doit dispenser jamais, ni un prince, ni un honnête homme d'accomplir sa parole, et il n'y en a point qui puisse le récompenser de l'avoir enfreint."

"Beyond this, no interest, no advantage, must ever excuse either a prince or an honest man from accomplishing his word, and there is none that can reward him for having infringed it." (Les Sentiments, 259)

"On n'est pas obligé d'observer la parole à ceux qui nous ont trahi, ou qui ont manqué à la leur."

"We are not obliged to observe our word to those who have betrayed us, or who have broken theirs." (Les Sentiments, 260)

Sunday, September 14, 2025

Article on Kristina and the execution of Monaldeschi from the point of view of international law, from article written by S. R. Björksten for "Juridiska Föreningens i Finland Tidskrift", year 1939

Source:

Drottning Christina och Monaldesco från folkrättslig synpunkt, article written by S. R. Björksten for Juridiska Föreningens i Finland Tidskrift, issue 1, pages 12 to 24, issue of January 1, 1939; original at the Finnish National Library (Kansalliskirjasto/Nationalbiblioteket)


Juridiska Föreningens i Finland Tidskrift, 01.01.1939 no 1, s. 12-1164 https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/aikakausi/binding/1104513 Kansalliskirjaston Digitaaliset Aineistot

The article:

Drottning Christina och Monaldesco
*från folkrättslig synpunkt.*
Den 10 november 1657 lät drottning Christina i Galerie des cerfs (hjortgalleriet) i palatset i Fontainebleau avrätta sin förste hovstallmästare, den italienske markisen Giovanni Rinaldo Monaldesco av den förnäma ätten Monaldeschi från Ascoli. Avrättningen, som föregicks av en snabb rannsakan, verkställdes på Christinas befallning av chefen för hennes livgarde, greve Ludovico Santinelli, jämte två soldater. Närvarande voro ytterligare drottningens hovkaplan och jämväl priorn för trinitatisklostret i Fontainebleau, pater le Bel, vilken lämnat en skriftlig redogörelse för vad som timat.

Händelsen i Fontainebleau väckte ett oerhört uppseende överallt i Europa och har aldrig upphört att intressera eftervärlden. Den har gett upphov åt skandal- och annan mer eller mindre ovederhäftig litteratur, där det göres gällande att er*tiska motiv väglett drottning Christina eller att rivalskap mellan Monaldesco och bröderna Francesco Maria och Ludovico Santinelli legat bakom. I en för ett par år sedan utkommen undersökning om drottning Christina och Monaldesco smular den kände historikern Curt *Weibull* (*Curt *Weibull*, Drottning Christina och Monaldesco, Stockholm 1936.*) sönder dylika kannstöperier och påvisar att motivet till drottningens handlingssätt var politiskt. Monaldesco skulle ha förrått Christinas planer på Neapel till Spanien och dessutom sökt kasta skulden för förräderiet på en annan. Monaldesco blev således dömd och avrättad för ett politiskt brott.

Var drottning Christina juridiskt befogad att handla så som hon gjorde? Själv ansåg sig drottningen vara i sin fulla rätt. Hon var visserligen icke längre regerande drottning utan hade tre år tidigare avsagt sig Sveriges krona, men i abdikationsskriften (*Se *Stiernman*, Alla Riksdagars och Mötens Besluth, band II, s. 1208 ff.*), som är dagtecknad Uppsala den 1 juni 1654, hade hon förbehållit sig allehanda förmåner. Hon var befriad från »all subjection och lydno»; hon hade sig tilldelade underhållsländer; undersåtarna i dessa skulle avlägga trohetsed till drottningen, som ägde tillsätta domare och tjänstemän. I punkt VII heter det: »Bryter någon i wårt egit Hoff eller under wårt Liif-Guardie, då skall Oss wara fritt hwadh heller Wij saaken under een Borg-Rätt eller till ordinarie Rätten som der in loco stadder är komma låtha;...» Christina förmenade sig vara suverän och såsom suverän få utöva domsrätt över sin svit på utländsk botten.

Min avsikt är att från folksrättslig synpunkt skärskåda problemet om drottning Christina verkligen var i sin fulla juridiska rätt då hon dömde och lät avrätta sin förste hovstallmästare. Den internrättsliga frågan huruvida Christinas handlingssätt var överensstämmande med Sveriges lag skall lämnas därhän. *Weibull* hävdar, med åberopande av de s. k. gårdsrätterna, att så var förhållandet (**Weibull* s. 89 ff.*).

Låtom oss först se efter huru det som skedde i Fontainebleau den 10 november 1657 skulle te sig i den moderna folkrättens ljus.

Om suveräner som befinna sig utomlands skriver *Fauchille*: »En främmande suverän har ingen domsrätt, varken civil eller kriminell, över dem som höra till hans svit» (**Fauchille*, Traité du droit international public, I:III, s. [...] Paris 1926, n:r 645.*). Lika kategoriskt uttrycka sig åtskilliga andra folkrättslärde. Somliga äro mindre oförbehållsamma. Här må anföras ett uttalande av f. d. ryske baronen Alfons von *Heyking*, som under en tjugoårig diplomatisk karriär förvärvat sig praktisk insikt på sitt område. Han säger: »Den så omtvistliga frågan om omfattningen av den jurisdiktion som suverän utomlands har över medlemmar av sin svit bör lösas på det sätt att han endast må utöva frivillig rättsvård och handhava civil domsrätt i trängande fall och inom de gränser som lagen i hans land dragit. Varken schahen av Persien eller sultanen av Turkiet kunde under sina resor genom Europa göra sin absoluta makt gällande emot dem som tillhörde deras svit.» (*v. *Heyking*, L'exterritorialité et ses applications en Extrême Orient, Académie de droit international, Recueil des Cours, 1925:II (7), s. 285.*) Av yttranden som det nyss anförda framgår att även de som tillerkänna främmande suveräner ett visst mått av jurisdiktion dock på inga villkor förunna dem en jurisdiktion av den art som drottning Christina tillvällade sig.

Frågas må om drottning Christina jämlikt modern folkrätt skulle efter sin tronavsägelse ha behandlats som suverän. Saken är långt ifrån så enkel som den i första hand syns. Visserligen är det så att en suverän som avsagt sig sin krona förlorar de förmåner och rättigheter som hans egenskap av suverän tillförsäkrat honom, och den respekt som efter abdikeringen eventuellt visas från främmande makters sida bottnar i ren »*courtoisie*», icke i folkrätten. Men beaktas bör att drottning Christina, såsom vi redan funnit, hade förbehållit sig förmåner vilka icke pläga tillkomma vanliga dödliga. Törhända — jag uttalar blott en förmodan — är detta en omständighet som t. o. m. enligt nutida folkrätt skulle ha kunnat påverka hennes rättsläge. Det är knappast möjligt att från vår egen tid framdraga några fullt jämförliga fall. Då i våra dagar en monark abdikerar, får han icke behålla sådana rättigheter som beviljades Christina.

Det finns ett fall som dock bör åberopas, nämligen beträffande påven. Sedan Kyrkostaten år 1870 erövrats av konungariket Italien och påven sålunda upphört att vara monark i en världslig stat, utfärdades den 13 maj 1871 en italiensk lag, garantilagen, som tryggade honom vid en suveräns rättigheter och vars grundsatser respekterades av andra länder, ehuru dessa givetvis icke voro bundna av den italienska lagen (*Genom lateranfördraget av den 11 februari 1929 upprättades en politisk bildning som kallas Vatikanstaten, La Città del Vaticano, men huruvida Vatikanstaten är att betrakta som en verklig stat är tvivelaktigt.*). Men omförmälda fall är icke analogt med fallet Christina. Det existerar en väsentlig skillnad mellan en monark som avstår sin krona och påven som oavsett Kyrkostatens öde förblev överhuvud för den katolska kyrkan.

Det är uppenbart att affären Monaldesco måste bedömas, icke efter den folkrätt som nu är gällande, utan efter den folkrätt som på hans tid var rådande. Oss förestår följaktligen uppgiften att granska fallet Christina från den dåtida folkrättens synpunkt. Men innan vi gå löst på denna uppgift, skola vi först söka utreda i vad mån diplomatiska representanter ha i förläggningslandet domsrätt över dem som tillhöra deras beskickning. Det är icke ett hugskott som föranleder att detta spörsmål upptages här; en jämförelse mellan en suveräns domsrätt över sin svit och en diplomatisk representants domsrätt över medlemmarna i sin beskickning har fog för sig.

Om diplomatiska representanters domsrätt i vår egen tid lämnar oss baron v. *Heyking* besked (*v. *Heyking*, s. 268 f.*). I de flesta europeiska länder inskränker sig, framhäver han, denna domsrätt till frivillig rättsvård och i brottmål till vad som kallas »*erster Angriff*». D. v. s., efter häktning skrides till fastställande av fakta, varpå den brottslige sändes till sitt hemland, där formell rannsakan inledes mot honom. Vid ett dylikt tillfälle är ambassadören berättigad att begära handräckning av de lokala domstolarna och övriga lokala myndigheter. Vid polisförbrytelser och -överträdelser får ambassadören icke överskrida måttet för ett korrektionellt straff (»*punition correctionnelle*»), von *Heykings* uppfattning sammanfaller så gott som helt med den som redan i mitten på 1800-talet förfäktades av *Heffler* (**Heffler*, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, 7. Aufl. bearb. von Geffcken, Berlin 1882, s. 440 f.*).

Emellertid medger von *Heyking* att i äldre tider många gånger måttet för korrektionellt straff åsidosattes, och han åberopar tre fall (*v. *Heyking*, s. 269.*). Ett av dessa fall är fallet de Rosny. Medan markis de Rosny, sedermera hertig de Sully, var extraordinarie ambassadör i London, förövade en medlem av hans svit ett mord. Ambassadören tillkallade några fransmän, som beledsagat honom, igångsatte en rättegång och dömde honom att mista huvudet. Härpå underrättade han mayorn i London om saken och begärde rättstjänare och en bödel för att verkställa domen. Men så samtyckte han till att överlämna den skyldige till engelsmännen för att dessa skulle låta rättvisan ha sin gång. Frankrikes ordinarie ambassadör utverkade slutligen av Englands konung nåd åt den brottslige, von *Heyking* omtalar vidare att spanske ambassadören i Venetianska republiken dömde en hustjänare till döden och lät hänga honom i fönstret till sitt hotell. Lika förfor franske ambassadören i London med en hustjänare som begått stöld.

Fallet de Rosny har här refererats med ledning av *Vattel*, vars kända arbete i folkrätt snart firar tvåhundraårsminne. Det är av intresse att taga del av vad *Vattel* har att säga om sändebuds jurisdiktion (**Vattel*, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, London, 1758, livre IV chap. 9 § 144. Vattels liksom flera andra här omnämnda folkrättslärdes verk ha i reproducerat skick utgetts av Carnegiestiftelsen i serien: »The classics of International Law».*). En ambassadör bör, förklarar *Vattel*, vara utrustad med så stor myndighet att han kan hålla sitt folk i styr. Efter att hava redogjort för affären de Rosny framhåller han att det beror på suveränen om hans ambassadörs befogenheter gå så långt som de gingo i nämnda fall. I regel måste förutsättas, förmenar han, att ambassadören förfogar över blott så mycken tvångsmakt som behövs för att hålla legationsfolket i schack och som inbegriper anlitande av fängelse och andra straff men icke av straff som gälla livet eller äro vanärande. *Vattel* anser för sin del att, om ambassadören dömt den skyldige till döden, han icke kan verkställa domen inom sitt hotell, ty en dylik exekution skulle innebära utövning av territoriell överhöghet (*supériorité territoriale*), vilken blott tillhör landets suverän.

Måhända kan det sägas att diplomatiska sändebud fordomdags hade över dem som räknades till beskickningen en synnerligen vidsträckt domsrätt. Är det skäl att antaga att suveräner hade en lika omfattande jurisdiktion över sin svit?

Saken är icke utan vidare klar. Det vill synas som om överhuvudtaget utländska suveräners ställning ursprungligen icke haft samma helgd som diplomatiska sändebuds och att icke ens den immunitet eller befrielse från vistelselandets domsrätt som, med vissa inskränkningar, numera tillförsäkras främmande statsöverhuvud har samma hävd som motsvarande immunitet i fråga om diplomatiska sändebud. I den äldre folkrättsliga litteraturen har t. o. m. den åsikt uttalats att suverän som beträder främmande territorium borde likställas med privatperson (*Så på sätt och vis *Zouch*, Juris et judicii fecialis, sive Juris inter gentes et quaestionum de eodem explicatio, 1650, pars II sectio II quaest. 6 & 9.*). Till stöd för denna uppfattning anföres: hurusom Karl av Anjou lät avrätta konung Konradin år 1268; hurusom kejsar Henrik VII dömde konung Robert av Neapel till konfiskering och döden — påven Klemens V upphävde likväl domen —; och slutligen huru drottning Elisabet av England lät avrätta Maria Stuart. Dessa fall äro icke övertygande. I det första fallet var det fråga om en monark som tagits till fånga i strid (*Det är från denna synpunkt den italienske rättslärde *Gentili* tager saken, då han i sitt arbete »De jure belli libri tres», 1598, lib. III cap. VIII, behandlar fallet under frågan huru fiendens tillfångatagna ledare böra behandlas.*). Det andra fallet förlorade genom påvens inskridande sin udd. För övrigt äro dessa två fall föråldrade. Maria Stuart hade, även om det skedde av tvång, år 1587 avsagt sig den skotska kronan (*Synbarligen hade Maria Stuart vid sin tronavsägelse icke lyckats förbehålla sig sådana rättigheter som drottning Christina.*). Förmodligen var åtminstone redan på Christinas tid grundsatsen om suveräners befrielse från främmande stats domsrätt vedertagen i praxis.

Det bör icke förvåna, att, då utländska suveräners immunitet av somliga kunde betvivlas, meningsskiljaktigheter yppade sig i frågan om deras domsrätt över sin svit. Det var just fallet Christina och Monaldesco som åstadkom att olika åsikter bröto sig mot varandra. Några axplock ur den folkrättsliga litteraturen.

Av *Leibniz* hävdas att en suverän under vistelsen utomlands bevarar sin domsrätt över de sina och att drottning Christina icke missbrukade sin rätt när hon lät avrätta Monaldesco, vilken hon dömt till döden (**Leibniz*, De jure suprematus ac legationum principum Germaniae, 2 uppl. London 1678, cap. 6.*). Det som möjligen kunde förebrås henne var att hon icke tog tillbörlig hänsyn till den plats där hon vistades.

Den holländske rättslärde *Bynkershoek* ställer sig på en annan ståndpunkt (**Bynkershoek*, De foro legatorum, 1723. Fransk översättning i tom II av Wicquefort, L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions, 3 uppl. 1723, kap. III §§ IV och XVI.*). Visserligen inser han icke varför en furste som befinner sig inom en annan furstes landamären skulle vara förhindrad att gent emot de sina utöva suveränitetsrättigheter, men så snart uppehållsstatens suveränitet beröres, är, förmenar *Bynkershoek*, den förstnämnda fursten oförmögen att lagligen utföra suveränitetshandlingen. Eftersom domsrätten är en beståndsdel av suveräniteten, var det med skäl man i Frankrike tog illa vid sig med anledning av det drottning Christina tillät sig gent emot en av sitt husfolk. Att franska hovet icke drev saken längre skedde, påstodo somliga, av hänsyn för den stackars drottningen, skedde, sade andra, av åstundan att följa folkrättens bud.

*Vattel* står i sin uppfattning *Bynkershoek* nära (**Vattel*, livre IV chap. 7 § 108.*). En utländsk suverän bevarar tvivelsutan, heter det hos honom, alla sina rättigheter över sin stat och sina undersåtar och kan utöva dem i allt som icke beror suveräniteten över det territorium där han befinner sig. Fördenskull var man onödigtvis skuggrädd i Frankrike då man icke ville tillåta kejsar Sigismund att under en vistelse i Lyon upphöja sin vasall, greven av Savoyen, till hertig. Men däremot var det med synnerligt skäl man i Frankrike tog illa vid sig över att Christina lät avrätta en av sina tjänare, ty en verkställighet av denna art innebar utövning av territoriell domsrätt.

Ytterligare må G. F. von *Martens* åberopas (**G. F. v. Martens*, Précis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, 2 uppl., Gottingue, 1801, § 172.*). Hans åsikt är denna: i stöd av exterritorialitet tillerkännas främmande monarker åtminstone civil domsrätt över dem som tillhöra deras svit, men de kunna icke tillerkännas rätt att under sin vistelse utomlands utöva sådana rättigheter som hava verkningar i den stat där de befinna sig.

Den äldre litteraturen har icke blott sysslat med spörsmålet om suveräners domsrätt utan har dessutom, med avseende fäst vid fallet Christina, beaktat frågan om de suveräners rättsläge vilka avsagt sig kronan.

Den omständighet att drottning Christina icke längre var innehavare av Sveriges krona rubbade icke *Leibniz'* ståndpunkt att drottningen handlat i sin fulla juridiska rätt (**Leibniz* cap. X, XII & XXVIII.*). Han ville utsträcka de en furste tillkommande privilegierna till medlemmar av hans familj o. s. v.

Av annan uppfattning var Abraham de *Wicquefort* (**Wicq[u]efort*, I s. 31 f.*). Enligt honom förlorar suverän som abdikerar alla de rättigheter som åtfölja suveräniteten, bl. a. rätten att sända ambassadörer och ministrar (*ministres publics*) (*»*Ministre public*» är i många fall den franska tekniska termen för diplomatiskt sändebud.*). Börden påtrycker furstarna en karaktär som aldrig utplånas och som gör att de böra behandlas med respekt, men de rättigheter som höra till suveräniteten äro knutna vid den som besitter denna. De kunna icke tillerkännas vem som helst icke förbehållas den som abdikerar. Att Christina utövade suveränitet och att hänsyn visades hennes ministrar berodde på att hon hade en förtjänst och en själsstorhet som hon icke kunde giva ifrån sig med Sveriges krona.

*Bynkershoek* (**Bynkershoek*, kap. III § VI anm. 5.*) finner det svårt att fastslå att furstar vilka i likhet med Sveriges drottning avsagt sig kronan skulle bemötas på samma sätt som då de ännu buro den. Deras ställning synes i mycket närma sig enskilda personers av förnäm börd.

Såsom redan konstaterats, anser *Vattel* (**Vattel*, livre IV chap. 7 § 108.*) det missnöje befogat som Christinas handlingssätt väckte i Frankrike. För övrigt, tillägger han, hade Christina abdikerat. Hennes förbehåll, börd, värdighet kunde tillförsäkra henne stora ärebetygelser, ja t. o. m. ett fullständigt oberoende, men icke alla en regerande suveräns rättigheter.

Av de äldre författare som här blivit åberopade är det blott *Leibniz* som från juridisk ståndpunkt obetingat gillar drottning Christinas tillvägagångssätt i fallet Monaldesco. På samma ståndpunkt står en samtida till honom, professor Johan *Tesmar* (*Se härom *Weibull*, s. 85.*). De övriga äldre författare som i det föregående anförts uttala sig mer eller mindre kritiskt om drottningens förfarande. Deras anmärkningar gälla två omständigheter. 1) Christina hade överskridit gränsen för den domsrätt som en suverän utomlands hade över sin svit. Den tanke skymtar att det måhända icke var fällandet av dödsdomen utan blott verkställigheten som var det betänkliga. 2) Christina hade avsagt sig kronan och därmed förlorat sina anspråk på en suveräns rättigheter.

Förevarande undersökning tyckes utmynna i det resultat att drottning Christinas handlingssätt icke hade stöd i den folkrätt som på hennes tid var rådande. Emellertid är det anledning att icke förhasta sig i sina slutsatser. Flera av de författare vilkas uppfattning refererats levde och verkade på 1700-talet, en t. o. m. i början av förra århundradet. Skäl finnes för förmodan att deras åsikter icke riktigt återspegla rättsåskådningen i mitten på 1600-talet utan att de snarare företräda en åskådning som bildar övergången till vår egen tid. Uteslutet är icke heller att dessa författare icke i tillbörlig mån beaktat praxis. Visserligen hänvisa de till praxis, men å andra sidan äro några anhängare av den naturrättsliga skolan.

Vidare bör anmärkas att de omförmälda skriftställarna knappast fäste nödigt avseende vid de förbehåll som vid tronavsägelsen gjordes till Christinas förmån. *Vattel* talar visserligen om hennes förbehåll; han förklarar ju att varken drottningens börd, förbehåll eller värdighet kunde tillförsäkra henne en suveräns rättigheter. Men *Vattel* hör icke till djupliggarna. Han var en framstående stilist och hade förmåga att på ett briljant sätt framlägga sitt ämne, men huvudsakligen återgav han blott vad andra och i synnerhet hans lärofader Wolff sagt före honom. Fastän *Vattels* arbete (*Här åsyftas förstås det redan nämnda arbetet »Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle».*) är ett av de oftast citerade och åberopade verken i den folkrättsliga litteraturen, finns det många folkrättslärde som icke tillmäta honom någon större betydelse. Att *Vattel* nämnde Christinas förbehåll är ingen borgen för att han verkligen satt sig in i problemet.

Upprepas må vad som redan blivit omtalat, att drottning Christina vid sin tronavsägelse befriades från »all subjection och lydno», att hon fick sig tilldelade underhållsländer, vilkas domare och tjänstemän hon ägde tillsätta, och att hon tillförsäkrades rätt att draga brott, förövat av någon vid hennes hov eller livgarde, under borgrätt, såvitt hon icke hellre lät det komma under ordinarie domstol. Efter sin abdikering behandlades Christina som suverän, ackrediterade och mottog diplomatiska sändebud o. s. v. Var allt detta betingat uteslutande av »*courtoisie*», av hänsyn för hennes person, av tacksamhet för den nitälskan hon röjde för den katolska tron? Eller står förklaringen delvis att söka i de förbehåll som stadgats i abdikationsskriften och måste ha framkallat den föreställning att hon icke var en vanlig privatperson? Det är frestande att tillgripa sistnämnda förklaring.

Klausulen om borgrätt är märklig. Då den uppsattes var det troligtvis antingen klart eller sannolikt att Christina skulle bosätta sig utomlands. Det var att räkna med att hon skulle komma att på utländsk botten utöva den henne tillerkända domsrätten över hovfolk och livgarde. Och törhända fann man däri ingenting stötande. Vi gå ett steg längre i gissning. Vem vågar påstå att denna klausul icke påverkade det franska hovets hållning emot Christina efter Monaldescos avrättning!

Belysande för Christinas ställning, sedan hon avstått från Sveriges krona, var den kvartersfrihet hon lyckats förskaffa sig i Rom (*Om Christinas kvarterstvist med påven se bl. a. L. *Arckenholtz*, Mémoires de Christine, II, Leipzig 1751, s. 248 ff. och *Grauert*, Christina, Königinn von Schweden und ihr Hof, II, Bonn 1842, s. 337 ff.*).

Kvartersfriheten var en förmån som utländska makter åtnjöto i vissa huvudstäder, bl. a. även i Rom. I den påvliga huvudstaden var det brukligt att utlänningar slogo sig ned nära sitt eget sändebuds palats, sökte skydd hos honom och på sätt och vis räknades till hans följe. Småningom utsträckte sändebuden sin domsrätt över ett helt kvarter. Följden härav blev att grannhusen, ja hela gator åtnjöto befrielse från den lokala jurisdiktionen. Därav begagnade sig allehanda ljusskygga element. Kvartersfriheten ledde till svåra missbruk, varför påven Innocentius XI slutligen beslöt att avskaffa den.

År 1656 eller så omkring förvärvade sig Christina kvartersfrihet i Rom, ett belägg på det som redan framhävts, nämligen att hon behandlades som suverän. Det var först senare frågan om kvartersfrihetens hävande i Rom blev aktuell. Kejsaren och spanske konungen samtyckte för sin del till slopandet av denna förmån, dock under förbehåll att även Frankrike skulle vara med därom. England, Polen och Venedig förklarade sin anslutning. Men Ludvig XVI [sic] fasthöll vid kvartersfriheten. År 1687 avstod Christina sin kvartersfrihet.

Kort därpå inträffade likväl ett mellanfall som gav upphov åt en tvist mellan Christina och påven, en tvist som slutade först i och med drottning Christinas död år 1689. Under loppet av ifrågavarande tvist gjordes från påvens sida ett uttalande som möjligen kan tydas som ett bevis på att det var si och så med utländska furstars jurisdiktion, men det är vanskligt att påstå något säkert.

I sin undersökning om drottning Christina och Monaldesco söker Curt *Weibull* påvisa att drottning Christinas tillvägagående emot Monaldesco icke var rättsvidrigt ens i internationellt hänseende (**Weibull*, s. 84 ff.*). De synpunkter som här blivit anförda tyda på att *Weibulls* åsikt har starka skäl för sig, men svårt är det att uttala sig bestämt.
*S. R. Björksten.*

English translation (my own):

Queen Kristina and Monaldesco
*from the point of view of international law.*
On November 10, 1657, Queen Kristina had her first court equerry, the Italian Marquis Giovanni Rinaldo Monaldesco, of the noble Monaldeschi family of Ascoli, executed in the Galerie des Cerfs (the Deer Gallery) of the Palace of Fontainebleau. The execution, which was preceded by a quick interrogation, was carried out on Kristina's orders by the head of her bodyguard, Count Ludovico Santinelli, together with two soldiers. Also present were the Queen's court chaplain and the prior of the Trinity Abbey in Fontainebleau, Father le Bel, who has left a written account of what had happened.

The incident at Fontainebleau caused an immense sensation throughout Europe and has never ceased to interest posterity. It has given rise to scandalous and other more or less unsubstantiated literature, in which it is claimed that er*tic motives guided Queen Kristina, or that rivalry between Monaldesco and the brothers Francesco Maria and Ludovico Santinelli was behind it. In a study published a couple of years ago about Queen Kristina and Monaldesco, the well-known historian Curt *Weibull* (*Curt *Weibull*, Drottning Christina och Monaldesco, Stockholm, 1936.*) crumbles such ultracrepidarianism and shows that the motive for the Queen's actions was political. Monaldesco is said to have betrayed Kristina's plans for Naples to Spain and also sought to blame the betrayal on someone else. Monaldesco was thus convicted and executed for a political crime.

Was Queen Kristina legally entitled to act as she did? The Queen herself considered herself to be in her full right. She was certainly no longer reigning queen, but had renounced the crown of Sweden three years earlier; but in the abdication document (*See *Stiernman*, Alla Riksdagars och Mötens Besluth, volume II, pp. 1208 ff.*), which is dated Uppsala on June 1, 1654, she had reserved for herself all sorts of privileges. She was exempted from "all subjection and obedience"; she had been allocated maintenance lands; the subjects in these were to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen, who had the right to appoint judges and officials. In point VII it is stated: "If someone commits a crime in Our own court, or within Our bodyguard, then We shall be free, whether We want to let the matter come under civil court, or to the ordinary Court which is located there in that place;..." Kristina claimed to be sovereign and, as sovereign, to exercise jurisdiction over her suite on foreign soil.

My intention is to examine from the point of view of international law the problem of whether Queen Kristina was truly within her full legal rights when she sentenced and had her first court equerry executed. The internal legal question of whether Kristina's course of action was in accordance with Swedish law should be left aside. *Weibull* claims, with reference to the so-called estate courts, that this was the case (**Weibull*, p. 89 ff.*).

Let us first see how what happened at Fontainebleau on November 10, 1657 would appear in the light of modern international law.

Regarding sovereigns who are abroad, *Fauchille* writes: "A foreign sovereign has no jurisdiction, either civil or criminal, over those who belong to his suite" (**Fauchille*, Traité du droit international public, I:III, p. [...], Paris 1926, no. 645.*). Several other scholars of international law express themselves equally categorically. Some are less unreserved. Here may be cited a statement by the former Russian Baron Alfons von *Heyking*, who, during a twenty-year diplomatic career, acquired practical insight in his field. He says: "The very controversial question of the extent of the jurisdiction that a sovereign abroad has over members of his suite should be resolved in such a way that he may only exercise voluntary legal care and exercise civil jurisdiction in urgent cases and within the limits drawn by the law of his country. Neither the Shah of Persia nor the Sultan of Turkey could, during their travels through Europe, assert their absolute power against those who belonged to their suite." (*v. *Heyking*, L'exterritorialité et ses applications en Extrême Orient, Académie de droit international, Recueil des Cours, 1925:II (7), p. 285.*) From statements such as the one just cited, it is clear that even those who grant foreign sovereigns a certain measure of jurisdiction do not, however, under any circumstances grant them a jurisdiction of the kind that Queen Kristina arrogated to herself.

It may be asked whether Queen Kristina, according to modern international law, would have been treated as a sovereign after her abdication. The matter is far from being as simple as it first appears. It is true that a sovereign who has renounced his crown loses the privileges and rights which his status as a sovereign has secured for him, and the respect which may be shown by foreign powers after the abdication is based on pure "*courtoisie*", not on international law. But it should be taken into account that Queen Kristina, as we have already found, had reserved for herself privileges which do not usually accrue to ordinary mortals. However — I am only expressing a supposition — this is a circumstance which, even according to modern international law, could have affected her legal position. It is hardly possible to bring forward any fully comparable cases from our own time. When a monarch abdicates in our day, he does not get to retain such rights as were granted to Kristina.

There is one case that should be mentioned, however, namely that of the Pope. After the Papal States had been conquered by the Kingdom of Italy in 1870 and the Pope had thus ceased to be the monarch of a secular state, an Italian law was issued on May 13, 1871, the Guarantee Law, which secured him the rights of a sovereign and whose principles were respected by other countries, although these were of course not bound by Italian law (*By the Lateran Treaty of February 11, 1929 a political entity called the Vatican City, La Città del Vaticano, was established, but whether the Vatican City is to be regarded as a real state is doubtful.*). But the case mentioned is not analogous to the case of Kristina. There is an essential difference between a monarch who renounces his crown and the Pope who, regardless of the fate of the Papal States, remained the head of the Catholic Church.

It is obvious that the Monaldesco affair must be judged not according to the international law that is now in force, but according to the international law that was prevailing in his time. We are therefore faced with the task of examining the Kristina case from the point of view of the international law of that time. But before we proceed with this task, we shall first seek to ascertain to what extent diplomatic representatives have jurisdiction in the country of their posting over those who belong to their mission. It is not a whim that causes this question to be raised here; a comparison between the jurisdiction of a sovereign over his suite and the jurisdiction of a diplomatic representative over the members of his mission is justified.

Baron v. *Heyking* gives us information about the jurisdiction of diplomatic representatives in our own time (*v. *Heyking*, p. 268 f.*). In most European countries, he emphasises, this jurisdiction is limited to voluntary legal assistance and in criminal cases to what is called "*erster Angriff*". That is, after arrest, steps are taken to establish the facts, after which the criminal is sent to his home country, where formal investigation is initiated against him. On such an occasion, the ambassador is entitled to request assistance from the local courts and other local authorities. In the case of police crimes and violations, the ambassador may not exceed the measure of a corrective punishment ("*punition correctionnelle*"). Von *Heyking's* view coincides almost entirely with that advocated by *Heffler* as early as the middle of the 19th century (**Heffler*, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, 7th ed., edited by von Geffcken, Berlin, 1882, pp. 440 f.*).

However, von *Heyking* admits that in earlier times the measure of corrective punishment was often disregarded, and he cites three cases (*v. *Heyking*, p. 269.*). One of these cases is the case of de Rosny. While the Marquis de Rosny, afterwards Duke de Sully, was ambassador extraordinary in London, a member of his suite committed a murder. The ambassador summoned some Frenchmen who had accompanied him, instituted a trial, and sentenced him to lose his head. Thereupon he informed the mayor of London of the matter and requested bailiffs and an executioner to carry out the sentence. But he then consented to hand over the culprit to the English, so that they might let justice take its course. The French ambassador finally obtained clemency from the King of England for the criminal; von *Heyking* further mentions that the Spanish ambassador to the Venetian Republic sentenced a servant to death and had him hanged in the window of his hotel. Similarly, the French ambassador in London dealt with a servant who had committed theft.

The de Rosny case has been referred to here with the guidance of *Vattel*, whose famous work in international law will soon celebrate its bicentennial. It is of interest to note what *Vattel* has to say about the jurisdiction of envoys (**Vattel*, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, London, 1758, book IV chap. 9 § 144. Vattel's work, like that of several other scholars of international law mentioned here, has been reproduced by the Carnegie Foundation in the series: "The classics of International Law".*). An ambassador should, *Vattel* explains, be endowed with such great authority that he can keep his people under control. After having explained the de Rosny affair, he emphasises that it depends on the sovereign whether his ambassador's powers extend as far as they did in the case in question. As a rule, he argues, it must be assumed that the ambassador has only as much coercive power as is necessary to keep the legation people in check, which includes the use of imprisonment and other punishments, but not of punishments that affect life or are humiliating. *Vattel* believes, for his part, that if the ambassador has sentenced the guilty party to death, he cannot execute the sentence within his hotel, because such an execution would involve the exercise of territorial supremacy (*supériorité territoriale*), which belongs only to the sovereign of the country.

Perhaps it can be said that diplomatic envoys of old had a very extensive jurisdiction over those who were included in the mission. Is there reason to suppose that sovereigns had an equally extensive jurisdiction over their suite?

The matter is not immediately clear. It would seem that the position of foreign sovereigns in general did not originally have the same sanctity as that of diplomatic envoys, and that not even the immunity or exemption from the jurisdiction of the country of residence which, with certain restrictions, is now assured to foreign heads of state has the same standing as the corresponding immunity in the case of diplomatic envoys. In the older literature of international law, the opinion has even been expressed that a sovereign who enters foreign territory should be equated with a private person (*So in a sense *Zouch*, Juris et judicii fecialis, sive Juris inter gentes et quæstionum de eodem explicatio, 1650, pars II, sectio II, quæst. 6 et 9.*). In support of this view, the following are cited: how Charles of Anjou had King Conradin executed in 1268; how Emperor Henry VII sentenced King Robert of Naples to confiscation and death — Pope Clement V nevertheless annulled the sentence —; and finally how Queen Elizabeth of England had Mary Stuart executed. These cases are not convincing. In the first case it was a question of a monarch who had been taken prisoner in battle (*It is from this point of view that the Italian jurist *Gentili* takes the matter, when in his work "De jure belli libri tres", 1598, lib. III, cap. VIII, he treats the case under the question of how captured enemy leaders should be treated.*). The second case lost its edge through the intervention of the Pope. Moreover, these two cases are obsolete. Mary Stuart had, even if it was done under duress, renounced the Scottish crown in 1587 (*Apparently, Mary Stuart had not managed to reserve for herself such rights as Queen Kristina when she abdicated.*). Probably at least in Kristina's time the principle of the exemption of sovereigns from the jurisdiction of foreign states was already accepted in practice.

It should not be surprising that, when the immunity of foreign sovereigns could be doubted by some, differences of opinion arose on the question of their jurisdiction over their suite. It was precisely the case of Kristina and Monaldesco which brought different opinions into conflict. Some extracts from the literature of international law.

*Leibniz* claims that a sovereign, while abroad, retains his right of jurisdiction over his own people, and that Queen Kristina did not abuse her right when she had Monaldesco executed, whom she had sentenced to death (**Leibniz*, De jure suprematus ac legationum principum Germaniæ, 2nd ed., London, 1678, cap. 6.*). What could possibly be reproached to her was that she did not take due account of the place where she was staying.

The Dutch jurist *Bynkershoek* takes a different position (**Bynkershoek*, De foro legatorum, 1723. French translation in volume II, by Wicquefort, L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions, 3rd ed., 1723, chap. III, §§ IV and XVI.*). He certainly does not see why a prince who is within the territory of another prince should be prevented from exercising his sovereign rights against them, but as soon as the sovereignty of the state of residence is affected, *Bynkershoek* argues, the first-mentioned prince is unable to legally perform the act of sovereignty. Since the right of jurisdiction is a component of sovereignty, it was with good reason that people in France took offense at what Queen Kristina allowed herself to do against one of her household members. That the French court did not pursue the matter further was, some claimed, out of consideration for the poor Queen; others said, it was out of a desire to follow the dictates of international law.

*Vattel* is close in his opinion to *Bynkershoek* (**Vattel*, livre IV, chap. 7, § 108.*). A foreign sovereign undoubtedly retains, he says, all his rights over his state and his subjects and can exercise them in everything that does not depend on sovereignty over the territory in which he is. For this reason, people in France were unnecessarily afraid of the shadows when they did not want to allow Emperor Sigismund to elevate his vassal, the Count of Savoy, to the rank of duke during a stay in Lyon. But on the other hand, it was with particular reason that people in France took offense at Kristina having one of her servants executed, because an execution of this kind meant the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

Furthermore, G. F. von *Martens* may be cited (**G. F. v. Martens*, Précis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, 2nd ed., Gottingue, 1801, § 172.*). His opinion is this: by virtue of extraterritoriality, foreign monarchs are at least granted civil jurisdiction over those who belong to their suite, but they cannot be granted the right to exercise, during their stay abroad, such rights as have effects in the state in which they are located.

The older literature has not only dealt with the question of the jurisdiction of sovereigns, but has also, with particular reference to the Kristina case, considered the question of the legal status of sovereigns who have renounced the crown.

The fact that Queen Kristina was no longer the holder of the Swedish crown did not alter *Leibniz's* position that the Queen had acted in her full legal right (**Leibniz*, cap. X, XII et XXVIII.*). He wanted to extend the privileges due to a prince to members of his family, etc.

Abraham de *Wicquefort* (**Wicquefort*, I, p. 31 f.*) held a different view. According to him, a sovereign who abdicates loses all the rights that accompany sovereignty, including the right to send ambassadors and ministers (*ministres publics*) (*"*Ministre public*" is in many cases the French technical term for diplomatic envoy.*). Birth imposes on princes a character that is never erased and which means that they must be treated with respect, but the rights that belong to sovereignty are attached to the one who possesses it. They cannot be granted to just anyone, nor reserved for the one who abdicates. The fact that Kristina exercised sovereignty and that consideration was shown to her ministers was due to her having a merit and a greatness of soul that she could not give up with the crown of Sweden.

*Bynkershoek* (**Bynkershoek*, chap. III, § VI, note 5.*) finds it difficult to establish that princes who, like the Queen of Sweden, had renounced the crown would be treated in the same way as when they still wore it. Their position seems to be very close to that of individuals of noble birth.

As already stated, *Vattel* (**Vattel*, livre IV, chap. 7, § 108.*) considers the discontent which Kristina's conduct aroused in France justified. Moreover, he adds, Kristina had abdicated. Her reservations, birth and dignity could assure her great honours, even complete independence, but not all the rights of a reigning sovereign.

Of the older authors cited here, only *Leibniz* unconditionally approves of Queen Kristina's approach in the Monaldesco case from a legal standpoint. A contemporary of his, Professor Johan *Tesmar* (*See on this *Weibull*, p. 85.*), holds the same position. The other older authors cited above express more or less critical views of the queen's approach. Their remarks concern two circumstances. 1) Kristina had exceeded the limits of the jurisdiction that a sovereign abroad had over his suite. The idea is hinted at that it was perhaps not the passing of the death sentence, but merely the execution that was questionable. 2) Kristina had renounced the crown and thereby lost her claim to the rights of a sovereign.

The present investigation seems to lead to the conclusion that Queen Kristina's course of action was not supported by the international law that prevailed in her time. However, there is reason not to rush to conclusions. Several of the authors whose views have been referred to lived and worked in the 18th century, one even at the beginning of the last century. There is reason to believe that their opinions do not accurately reflect the legal view of the middle of the 17th century, but rather that they represent a view that forms the transition to our own time. It is also not excluded that these authors did not take due account of practice. It is true that they refer to practice, but on the other hand some are followers of the school of natural law.

It should also be noted that the re-mentioned writers hardly paid due attention to the reservations made in Kristina's favour at the abdication. *Vattel* does indeed speak of her reservations; he explains that neither the Queen's birth, reservations nor dignity could assure her of the rights of a sovereign. But *Vattel* is not one of the profound ones. He was an outstanding stylist and had the ability to present his subject in a brilliant way, but he mainly only reproduced what others, and especially his teacher Wolff, had said before him. Although *Vattel's* work (*Here the already mentioned work "Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle" is, of course, referred to.*) is one of the most frequently cited and invoked works in the literature of international law, there are many scholars of international law who do not attribute any great importance to it. The fact that *Vattel* mentioned Kristina's reservations is no guarantee that he really understood the problem.

It may be repeated what has already been said, that Queen Kristina, on her abdication, was exempted from "all subjection and obedience", that she was assigned maintenance lands whose judges and officials she could appoint, and that she was assured the right to bring crimes committed by anyone at her court or bodyguard under civil court, unless she preferred to have them brought under ordinary court. After her abdication, Kristina was treated as a sovereign, accredited and received diplomatic envoys, etc. Was all this conditioned exclusively by "*courtoisie*", out of consideration for her person, out of gratitude for the zeal she manifested for the Catholic faith? Or is the explanation partly to be sought in the reservations stipulated in the abdication document and must have given rise to the idea that she was not an ordinary private person? It is tempting to resort to the latter explanation.

The clause about civil court is strange. When it was drafted, it was probably either clear or probable that Kristina would settle abroad. It was to be expected that she would exercise the jurisdiction granted to her over courtiers and bodyguards on foreign soil. And yet nothing objectionable was found in it. Let us go a step further in conjecture. Who dares to say that this clause did not influence the attitude of the French court towards Kristina after the execution of Monaldesco!

Illustrative of Kristina's position, after she renounced the crown of Sweden, was the freedom of quarters she managed to obtain in Rome (*On Kristina's quarter dispute with the Pope, see, among others, L. *Arckenholtz*, Mémoires de Christine, II, Leipzig, 1751, pp. 248 ff., and *Grauert*, Christina, Königinn von Schweden und ihr Hof, II, Bonn, 1842, pp. 337 ff.*).

The freedom of quarters was a privilege that foreign powers enjoyed in certain capitals, including Rome. In the papal capital, it was customary for foreigners to settle near the palace of their own envoy, seek protection with him, and in a way be counted among his entourage. Gradually, the envoys extended their jurisdiction over an entire quarter. The result of this was that neighbouring houses, even entire streets, enjoyed exemption from local jurisdiction. All kinds of shady elements took advantage of this. The freedom of quarters led to serious abuses, which is why Pope Innocent XI finally decided to abolish it.

In 1656 or thereabouts, Kristina acquired the freedom of quarters in Rome, a proof of what has already been emphasised, namely that she was treated as a sovereign. It was only later that the question of abolishing the freedom of quarters in Rome became relevant. The Emperor and the Spanish King agreed to the abolition of this privilege, but on the condition that France should also join in. England, Poland and Venice declared their accession. But Louis XVI [sic] insisted on the freedom of quarters. In 1687, Kristina renounced her freedom of quarters.

Shortly afterwards, however, an incident occurred that gave rise to a dispute between Kristina and the Pope, a dispute that only ended with Queen Kristina's death in 1689. During the course of the dispute in question, a statement was made by the Pope that could possibly be interpreted as proof that there was such and such a thing as the jurisdiction of foreign princes, but it is difficult to state anything for certain.

In his study of Queen Kristina and Monaldesco, Curt *Weibull* seeks to demonstrate that Queen Kristina's approach towards Monaldesco was not unlawful even in an international sense (**Weibull*, pp. 84 ff.*). The points of view that have been presented here indicate that *Weibull's* opinion has strong grounds for it, but it is difficult to express a definite opinion.
*S. R. Björksten.*

Note: "Föredrag vid Juridiska Föreningens årsmöte den 13 dec. 1938."